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ABSTRACT 
 
NATIONALIZATION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN TURKEY: 2003-2017 
 
Aycan Özer, Ayşe İrem 
MA in Political Science and International Relations 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. İsmail Yaylacı 
August 2017, 106 pages 
 
This thesis elaborates on the nationalization of Turkish defense industry since the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The objective of this thesis is to understand what explains 
the recent increasing trend of nationalization of the defense industry in Turkey. It 
firstly analyzes the regional conjuncture and lack of trust in allies so as to show how 
it influences Turkey’s investments in the sector. Then, it moves on to explain the 
domestic structure of the country which enables and inspires the politicians to 
attribute greater importance to industrial self-reliance in defense. Lastly, it focuses 
on the political economy of the defense industry and how big of an economy the 
sector generates at the global level and for Turkey. This thesis concludes that focusing 
on developing modern technology and production of specific arms of defense is more 
beneficial for Turkey’s future and position in the international market. 
 
Keywords: Defense Industry, Nationalization, Action-Reaction Model, Domestic 
Structure, Export License, Technology Transfer  
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ÖZ 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE SAVUNMA SANAYİİNİN MİLLİLEŞMESİ: 2003-2017 
 
Aycan Özer, Ayşe İrem 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. İsmail Yaylacı 
Ağustos 2017, 106 sayfa 
 
Bu tez çalışması Türk savunma sanayisinin 2003 Irak işgalinden itibaren millileşmesini 
etraflıca incelemiştir. Bu tez, savunma sanayiinde son zamanlarda artış gösteren 
millileşme eğiliminin sebeplerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak bölgesel 
konjönktürün ve müttefiklere olan güvensizliğin Türkiye’nin sektöre olan yatırımlarını 
nasıl etkilediği analiz edilmiştir. Ayrıca siyasetçilere sektörde yerlileşme olanağı 
sağlayan ve onları savunmada yatırım yapmaya teşvik eden devletin yerel yapısı 
incelenmiştir. Son olarak, savunma sanayisinin politik ekonomisi ve sektörün küresel 
düzeyde ve Türkiye için ne kadar büyük bir ekonomi meydana getirdiği üzerinde 
durulmuştur. Bu tez, modern teknoloji geliştirmeye odaklanmanın ve belirli bir 
savunma aracı üretmenin Türkiye’nin uluslararası pazardaki geleceği ve konumuna 
daha faydalı olacağı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Sanayi, Millileşme, Aksiyon-Reaksiyon Modeli, Yerel 
Yapı Modeli, İhraç Lisansı, Teknoloji Transferi 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister, 
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through 
Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish 
Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy 
a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, 
that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such 
far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your 
government to consult fully in advance with the United States. Ambassador 
Hare has indicated that you postponed your decision for a few hours in order to 
obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is 
appropriate for your government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally 
who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United 
States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility 
for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is 
taken... 
Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct 
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO 
allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in 
Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO 
allies... 
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under 
Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is 
required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for 
purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your 
government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that 
you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United 
States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment 
for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. 
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel 
obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion that fact that 
such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish 
Cypriots on the island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the 
furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be 
sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom 
you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not 
prevent such a catastrophe. 
... As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, 
we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a 
great ally with fundamental common interests... I must, therefore, inform you 
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in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not 
take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your 
injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for 
emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. 
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present 
constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could 
come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry 
a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a 
sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to 
delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have-in mind until you 
and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation. 
Sincerely. 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
 
On June 5, 1964, American President Johnson’s letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu 
strained the relations between the two countries. The letter marks a turning point in 
Turkey’s foreign policy, the perception of security and national defense. The crisis 
created by the disagreement over how to deal with the island led the unilateral 
intervention of Turkey in 1974 by sending land troops to Cyprus. As a result, the 
United States placed an embargo on Turkey. It led Turkey to search for ways to 
sustain self-sufficiency in country’s defense. 
 
This incident was a clear proof that the defense industry of a country is the only sector 
that is closely related and directly linked to the international relations. Because in the 
anarchical international system it is the defensive power of the state that determines 
its security and sovereignty. And such a power can be sustained by a self-reliant 
defense industry. Even though Turkey had tried to nationalize its defense after the 
crisis of 1974, these early periods of nationalization are studied in previous works. 
However, Turkey’s efforts of nationalization after 2000’s are not covered enough in 
academic texts. Hence, nationalization of the defense industry in Turkey in 2000’s is 
a subject that needs to be studied.  
 
In this thesis, my research question is what explains the increase in the share of 
national production in Turkey's military capabilities after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
The period I am going to concentrate on will start with the invasion of Iraq which is 
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followed up by the sequence of events that affected Turkey’s national security. In 
that regard, my thesis will be filling a periodic void. Even though there were attempts 
to establish a national defense industry before 2003, recent efforts are different as 
nationalizing critical components are also the goal. 
 
The power vacuum that occurred in Iraqi territory after the American invasion; lack 
of a central government which divided Iraq into three; and the formation of Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) in the Northern Iraq of which Turkey is suspicious 
because of its possible effect on independence movement inside Turkey are all 
reasons concerning Turkey’s security deeply. Breakdown of relations with Israel is 
another critical juncture as it prevented Turkey from using the surveillance 
technology provided by Israel. This case, in particular, speeded up the production of 
Turkey's own unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). 
 
Another turning point for Turkey was Arab uprisings that turned into a civil war in 
case of Syria. The fact that the regime in Syria was starting to threaten Turkey’s 
interests and security pushed Turkey to change its policy towards Syria drastically. 
Moreover, the power vacuum in Syrian territory added to the one in Iraq and brought 
into being ISIS that constitutes both an internal and an external threat for Turkey. As 
there is a point of contention regarding how to fight with it among countries in the 
anti-ISIS coalition, Turkey from time to time acts unilaterally to fulfill its interests. The 
same applies to Turkey’s struggle with the PKK as Turkey’s allies in the West do not 
consider the PKK as a terrorist organization. Hence, Turkey wants to follow its 
independent strategy against the PKK. Since the arms suppliers lay down conditions 
on use of their weapons, Turkey seeks alternative ways. As a result of all the arms 
race, terror and sectarian conflict in the geography, Turkey is committed to 
developing a national defense industry with a domestic technology which will enable 
it to act according to its interests. 
 
1.1. Methodology 
My study relied on both Turkish and English resources. In the literature, I looked at 
the relationship between military defense expenditure and country’s growth, and its 
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social implications. I studied the international arms dynamic and how it affects the 
foreign policy of countries. I reviewed newspaper articles since they give updated 
information which is not covered yet in academic texts. The reports of 
Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (UDI) were particularly important as it is the 
most important domestic institution putting defense projects out to tender. It 
provides the first-hand information in the field of defense industry. Reports of SASAD 
and TUBİTAK also highlight the investments and developments in the sector. The data 
of NATO, SIPRI, IHS Jane’s, and AT Kearney have provided information both on the 
country basis and about the international arms market. These are all prominent 
institutions in local and in global scale so they can provide with this research valuable 
and accurate information. Moreover, I used professionals’ opinions I gathered 
through personal interviews that I had conducted. Since they were familiar with the 
practices, they were able to shed light on areas that are not made public. 
 
I used process tracing and looked at the critical junctures in Turkey’s recent history 
deeply affecting Turkey’s security and propelling it to strengthen its national defense 
industry. I applied two theoretical approaches to this study. Domestic structure 
model and action-reaction model are the two approaches explaining the 
nationalization in defense sector which helped me understand the theory in general 
and explain Turkish case in particular. States are the unit of analysis as the decisions 
taken at the state level are the actual cause of the developments which inspired the 
study of this research. I used both quantitative and qualitative resources. 
Quantitative indicators revealed the strength of the change and developments in the 
defense industry through figures, charts, and tables. Qualitative indicators were 
helpful in understanding the importance of the change by examining selected cases.  
 
1.2. Thesis Overview 
In the beginning of 2000’s, Turkey had external surrounding conditions, domestic 
motivation and financial resources necessary to start an industrial self-reliance in 
defense which is not without its own challenges. Military spending of Turkey was 
$17.685 billion in 2003 and $17.669 billion in 2015 which shows no dramatic change 
in terms of expenditures. (SIPRI, 2016) Although the amount of spending remained 
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nearly the same, domestic production was able to meet the 25% of TAF’s needs in 
2003 which reached up to 60% in 2016. (SSM Performance Programme, 2016, p.4) 
Since there is no increase in the actual amount of spending the detail that draws 
attention is the reason behind the increase in the share of national production. So as 
to explain it, the literature review which will be discussed in the second chapter is 
going to analyze why countries nationalize their defense industry. The internal and 
external conditions that motivate states to become self-reliant in defense will be 
underlined in this section. I will review the literature of arms production, arms and 
defense industries, defense spending and economic growth in this chapter in order 
to come up with explanations that clarify Turkey’s recent investments in the sector.  
 
In the third chapter, I will be analyzing how Turkey is influenced by the invasion, 
regional sectarian conflicts, Arab uprisings, relations with Israel, Syrian civil war, 
emergence of ISIS and re-emerging PKK. These are critical junctures in Turkey’s recent 
wave of nationalization because together they present a national security threat to 
Turkey. In this context, I will also look how the diverging interests with its allies 
pushed Turkey to sustain its own security. Choosing self-reliance over cooperation 
with allies is significant since it presents a deviation for Turkey from its old security 
approach. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I am going to concentrate on the domestic factors that led to 
the development of a national defense industry. I will predominantly examine the 
role of electoral politics and the way politicians use the matters of defense and 
security in their election campaigns. Hence, I will be making a textual analysis of party 
declarations. Spillovers of national defense industry will also be part of this chapter 
as its effects in other areas are going to influence the domestic structure of Turkey 
through increasing employment and spreading technology to other fields which will 
boost overall development of the country. 
 
Chapter five will delve into the political economy of the defense industry in the world 
and in Turkey respectively. Seeing that it benefits the economies of countries that 
produce and sell defense equipment more than any other sector, Turkey as a growing 
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economy could not keep aloof from engaging in the process. This chapter will provide 
a detailed analysis of how Turkish economy is influenced by national arms 
development. It will elucidate on the economic and strategic difference between 
procuring from foreign suppliers and producing the same defense of arms 
domestically. 
 
Chapter six will make an overall summary of the thesis. I will show what I have found 
about nationalization of the defense industry in Turkey. Although the two models 
explain Turkey’s nationalization to an extent, in some respects the case of Turkey 
runs counter to the arguments presented in the literature. After pointing those out I 
will conclude by proposals for future studies which can shed further light on changing 
security perceptions in the world and in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In international relations theory states are generally taken to be the main actors, and 
there is no higher authority like a world government to regulate their relations among 
nation-states that create an anarchy in the system. The interaction among states in 
this anarchical environment is shaped by the power of each state. In order to protect 
their sovereignty states turn to use force either by themselves and by their allies 
according to realists or through other measures such as international law and 
institutions according to liberals. From a realist perspective, when states do not dread 
retaliation they cannot be deterred from attacking another country and this 
deterrence is guaranteed by their military power. As Mearsheimer (2001, p.33) 
suggests in the self-help system of international anarchy it is up to individual states 
to maximize their power to defend themselves. On the contrary to liberals’ claim 
about cooperation, political history proved that when it comes to national security 
cooperation of all kinds can come to a halt. This is why Kolodziej (1990, p.20) argue 
that history and past events should be the basis of security studies and the source of 
reference for the actor behavior. 
 
When security is the main topic of discussion, we can look at the use of violent and 
non-violent means. Whereas violent means is comprised of military measures non-
violent means consist of diplomacy and other soft power measures. (Kolodziej, 2005, 
p.22) As the question this thesis will answer is what explains the recent trend of 
nationalization in Turkey’s defense industry, I will be dealing with security not in its 
diplomatic sense but in its military sense. 
 
According to Paul R. Viotti (1994, p.3) national defense must be studied through 
looking at the international context that affects a nation’s security, its bureaucracy, 
agencies and decision makers. Colin Gray (1971, p.71) and Buzan and Herring (1998, 
p.103) Kenneth Boutin (2009, p.227) on the other hand suggest two models that 
explain the arms dynamic of a state which is telling about its national defense 
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strategy, and these are action-reaction model and domestic structure model. The 
claim of ¨action-reaction model¨ is that states increase their military power either to 
increase security in the face of threats coming from rivals or to fulfill their interests 
that run counter to the interests of others. (Buzan and Herring, 1998, p.83) In the 
international system states are always on alert as to who poses a threat to their 
security and the sense of threat sharpens the action-reaction model. Gray (1982, 
p.164) approaches to this sense of insecurity explained by Buzan and Herring from a 
different perspective. He says that states might act upon the perceived threats 
emanating from behaviors of others but these might also be misperceptions. For 
instance, country A might increase its military power out of security concerns not to 
threaten or attack country B. But country B will feel concerned about the 
militarization of the country A and start strengthening its own military. This indicates 
the misperception of country B. However, on the other hand this security dilemma is 
a reality of the international system. And it is actually what the action-reaction model 
is all about. The action of country A is creating the reaction of country B. Such a 
vicious circle is the driving force behind the military build-up of states and the world-
wide arms race. To sum up, action-reaction model prioritizes the international 
context which gives a state reason and motivation to increase its military power. 
 
Nationalizing the defense industry is also preferred by any country since it will end 
the dependency stemming from reliance on other countries. It will as a result sustain 
national sovereignty (Boutin, 2009, p.227) As opposed to those in favor of increased 
militarization, others see the destabilizing effect of proliferation of arms in the world 
and also its negative socio-political implications at domestic level. Destabilizing effect 
of arms build-up derives from the ultimate result of the process which is arms race. 
Boutin (2009, p.230) remarks that the urge to catch-up with the military capabilities 
of rivals encourages investment in national R&D. Ram (1993, p.28), Viotti (1994, p.4), 
and Buzan & Herring (1998, p.48) too point out that when some countries build up 
military power it induces others to participate in the arms race lest they will be 
vulnerable in the face of increasing armaments of others, and this interaction which 
creates a world-wide effect is called ¨ world military order.¨ The adverse effects of the 
arms race can be seen both in international and national levels. At the international 
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level, it creates a constant fear of war; it hurts the cooperation between states; 
decreases the budget for aid which can improve the conditions in LDCs; influences 
the foreign policy which is shaped in great amount by security concerns. (Thee, 1981, 
pp.52-53) As UN Group of Consultant Experts including S. A. Consalvi, H. de Haan, D. 
Djokic et al. suggest ¨ the creation of spheres of influence, local regional or global, and 
sometimes interference, direct or roundabout, in the domestic affairs of other states 
becomes a natural corollary of a world-wide arms race.¨ (Thee, 1981, p.45) 
 
Whereas the action-reaction model is looking at the international context and 
external factors ¨domestic structure model¨ completes it by focusing on the internal 
and domestic dynamics that encourage states to promote militarization of the 
country. The latter explains the variables such as electoral factors, military-industrial 
complex of a specific country, and economic management of the government. 
Electoral politics is an important component of a country’s domestic structure. It can 
encourage politicians to promise new investments and jobs in the defense industry 
which increase their appeal to the electorate. (Buzan and Herring, 1998, p.108) 
Additionally, politicians, industry owners and journalists might promote the ¨ national 
preparedness syndrome¨ and use it as an electoral tool which Gray (1971, p.75) calls 
the epidemiological argument. Similarly, Buzan and Herring (1998, p.101) state that 
the threats stemming from the behavior of the rivals might be useful for politicians’ 
agenda of increasing the military power of the country. These are important tools to 
forge a domestic unity which during the time of elections come in mighty handy for 
politicians. Because when politicians show that they are invested in the victory and 
glory of the country they manage to draw people’s attention. The claims of the 
politicians in this regard does not have to be based on electoral calculations it might 
actually stem from military weakness that leave the state vulnerable in case of crisis 
and conflict. It can be seen in cases of regional military conflicts that jeopardize 
Turkey’s security such as the war in Syria and attacks by ISIS. There are real problems 
stemming from such threats in the region and they give Turkish statesmen a reason 
to increase country’s military power. It saves them from the trouble of making 
promises without solid ground. Because when a country is inferior in terms of its 
military capacity ¨no option is believed open other than to strain all resources to 
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attain a better military balance¨. (Gray, 1971, p.64) Even when there are no tangible 
threats to country’s security Gray (1971, p.41) argues that promises of military 
investment are still important for domestic politics since it creates a political 
tranquility through the honor of national glory. 
 
Although military investments are an important tool of electoral politics, they also 
have a considerable impact on the country’s economy. It might have advantages or 
disadvantages but it depends on the country in question. However, the explanations 
in the literature can be helpful in understanding the certain conditions required to 
observe positive or negative impacts of defense spending.  
 
2.1. Political Economy of the Defense Industry 
Military expenditures might have two opposite impacts on a country’s economy 
depending on the context. It might either stimulate a positive or a negative impact. 
Its effects are positive if the country has enough economic resources and it does not 
have to cut down on the financing of other public expenditures such as health, 
education, transportation services that directly serve the public interests. In such a 
case, a country does not have to reduce the spending on socially constructive projects 
that improve the welfare in the short-term. Moreover, it can reap the fruits of 
investing in the military industry in the long-term as military projects require long 
time to develop. So it does not have to give up on any of the benefits provided by 
investing in different sectors. However, the research also shows that military 
expenditures might have a reverse effects on the economy. (Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; 
Karaosmanoglu & Kibaroglu, 2002; Dritsakis, 2004) It particularly applies to 
economically developing countries which have to procure the expensive defense of 
arms from the countries who produce them or who initiate the process of producing 
arms for themselves. When they import, it creates a balance of payment problem for 
the economy. When they want to produce nationally, they canalize a great amount 
of money into making weapons. It steals from the resources of civilian use for a 
spending that will not serve economic growth or public benefit. (Dritsakis, 2004, 
p.251) This is a condition that applies to countries which are short of budget and in 
need of constructive reforms. 
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There are four approaches regarding the relationship between military expenditure 
and economy. The first one is military Keynesianism which suggests that military 
spending stimulates the economy if the country itself produces the military materiel 
rather than spending the money on procuring from foreign suppliers. (Dunne, 2011, 
p.1) When the demand is insufficient, the state uses military expenditures as part of 
any other public expenditure which stimulates the economy and causes an increase 
in production. (Buzan and Herring, 1998, p.35; Dunne, 2011, p.2; Duyar & Koçoğlu, 
2014, p.710) It also assumes that military spending enhances capacity utilization by 
increasing profits, investment, and growth. (Baran and Sweezy, 1966 in Dunne) Ram 
mentions that defense programs can benefit the civilian economy through spillovers 
for other industrial sectors and improve the conditions for the overall economy. 
(Ram, 1993, p.28) Hence, benefits of increased military spending is not limited by a 
militarily stronger country. Commercial spin-offs contribute to development of non-
military industries and to increase of employment opportunities. (Viotti, 1994, p.4) 
As a result, an increase in military spending brings about utilization of capital stock, 
higher investments, and employment especially in an environment where a country 
experiences economic stagnation. These are seen by Yıldırım et al. (2005, p.284) as 
the stimulative effects of increased military expenditures. Moreover, it is also 
accepted that the developed countries who include military expenditures into public 
spending use it to strive recession in a time of crisis. (“World Military Spending — 
Global Issues,” 2013)  
 
The second is the Neo-classical model which sees military expenditures as a public 
good. It suggests that the state is a rational actor deciding upon the military spending 
depending on the costs and benefits it has on national interests. (Duyar & Koçoğlu, 
2014, p.710) Biswas and Ram developed this model drawing on Feder’s work on the 
impact of exports in growth. (Biswas, 1992, p.6) They (1986) suggest that military 
outlay has a positive effect on economic growth of Less Developed Countries (LDCs). 
(Biswas, 1992, p.10) In general, from the perspective of the neo-classical model, a 
country maximizes the wellbeing of the society through investing in security which is 
an important component of welfare. (Dunne et al., 2008, p.294) 
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The Marxist approach is the third model which has a difference of opinion regarding 
the issue. Some see military expenditures as a way of perpetuating capitalism 
whereas military-industrial complex theory emphasizes that there is only a section of 
the capitalist class that benefits from the military expenditures at the expense of the 
rest. (Coulomb & Bellais, 2008, pp: 355-358) Overall, it focuses on the class conflict 
perpetuated by the military industrial complex. According to this argument, 
militarism or patriotism may be employed by the capitalist class or the state in order 
to reduce the militancy of the labor class but exacerbating the class conflict within 
the process. (Cypher, 1987, p.307) Marxist model does not claim that military 
expenditures have pure positive or negative impacts. R. P. Smith (1976) and Ron 
Smith and Dan Smith (1983) stress the positive effects of military expenditures on 
¨international accumulation and negative impacts on investment, R&D, and 
productivity.¨ (in Riddell, 1986, p.579) 
 
The last is the institutionalist model which emphasizes that there are firms, 
corporations, and individuals that benefit from military expenditures and they will 
form lobbies which might induce the government to make military expenditures even 
though when it is not for the benefit of the country. (Karaosmanoglu & Kibaroglu, 
2002, p.711; Dunne, 2011, p.3) The role played by the industry owners who have a 
stake in the promotion of military build-up is the essence of military-industrial 
complex. Even when national security is not at risk members of this complex might 
encourage the state to make investment in the field of defense for their own 
economic gains by neglecting what might actually be for the good of the country. An 
economic analysis of Snyder’s perspective corresponds to this institutionalist 
approach to military expenditure. As Snyder (1991) says in his Myths of Empire such 
interest groups formed by ruling classes and their elite ideologies have the power to 
present what is at stake as if it is a matter of national security even if it is in their 
personal, or group, favor. This is why P. W. Singer (2004, p.170) calls them ¨profit-
motivated agents¨. And in order to protect their pecuniary interests they use their 
power to influence the ¨ political and social conditions¨ and work with the fears of the 
society by keeping it alive which undermines the efforts of disarmament. (Thee, 1981, 
pp.51-52)  
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While analyzing the institutionalist model, Ram emphasizes another aspect of 
military-industrial complex by pointing out that ¨upper-income classes may gain 
more from defense outlays than lower-income people. Such a pattern may make 
intra-country income distribution worse.¨ (Ram, 1993, p.28) Furthermore, it might 
pave the way for excessive militarization and promote military intervention in other 
countries. (Ram, 1993, p.27) So as to show how influential the military-industrial 
complex in determining the foreign policy of the USA Chomsky (2004, p.82) refers to 
it as ¨the core of the modern economy and American foreign policy.¨ 
 
The introductory statements made by four models of military expenditure can be 
further discussed with their impacts on a country’s economy. In countries’ defense 
heavy arms are used less than small arms but they are expensive to create. Hence big 
items like tanks and ships produce the economies of scale question for producer 
countries even if they are not bounded by budgetary restrictions. So as to tackle this 
problem producers intend to sell in order to lower the unit costs which push them to 
look for export markets. (Buzan & Herring, 1998, p.35) It can be turned into economic 
capabilities for those who export their military products but on the other hand it 
causes economic losses for countries that have to import such materiel or spend too 
much on the national development of these items. Positive effects can be assessed 
in two ways. Firstly, supplier countries extricate themselves from importing 
expensive weapons as it is produced domestically. So they save foreign exchange. 
Secondly, they fix the balance of payment problem and answer the economies of 
scale question through selling what they have.  
 
Above-mentioned two effects generate more positive externalities. As there is more 
production to meet both the local and international demand for weapons, it will 
improve the local employment levels which become the tool of electoral politics. 
However, it is also criticized for absorbing the skilled labor which could be used for 
socially productive purposes. In other respects, the skilled personnel of the military 
such as pilots, technicians, health professionals during their services and after 
retirement can be of service to civilians. (Ram, 1993, p.29) Since these professionals 
receive general education they increase the quality of society’s human-capital. (Ram, 
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1993, p.29) If we look at the issue from a different standpoint, it is possible to see the 
utility of trained military personnel for the society in general. For instance, they can 
serve better during the natural disasters with their ready equipment and soldiers 
since they are always on alert and constantly trained under harsh circumstances. 
(Ram, 1993, p.30; Archer & Annette, 2012, p.30) On the other hand, technology 
produced in the military research can be used in the civilian sectors as well. ¨Military 
innovations in air transportation, nuclear power generation, radar usage, space 
technology and other areas have been adapted to civilian use and constitute an 
important spillover of defense expenditure.¨ (Ram, 1993, p.28)  
 
Positive externalities of defense spending are not limited by these. When a state 
makes high levels of investment in its military it also takes good care of what it’s 
human-capital has tried so hard to build hence it tries to facilitate communication for 
military units through constructing ¨roads, bridges, communications network, 
airports, water works and townships.¨ (Ram, 1993, p.30) Even though some of these 
services are exclusive to military usage, civilians too have access to many of them. 
 
A strengthened national defense forms a secure social setting and a credible 
economic environment too. (Ram, 1993, p.30) As a result of that the country is 
perceived to be a destination for investment through building trust towards country’s 
future. This attracts long-term investments of both the foreigners and the locals 
which improves the economic growth. On the contrary, when a country is not seen 
as a safe haven for investments it cannot draw money in and that is what makes the 
security spillover a positive effect of military spending. Ram explains the economic 
importance of the sector with the following statement: 
 
If the defense sector is technologically more advanced than the rest of the 
economy, it could act as a ¨modern¨ sector that may facilitate overall growth. 
In particular, if input productivity is higher in defense than in the rest of the 
economy, expansion of defense outlays may improve growth rate ... since 
defense output is a part of total product (GNP or GDP). An empirical assessment 
of the presence and the magnitude of such an effect however indicate a 
somewhat uncertain picture. (Ram, 1993, p.31) 
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Therefore, scholars studying on the effects of defense spending on economy work 
with case studies and measure its impacts on a country basis rather than reaching to 
all-encompassing conclusions.  
 
Even though the positive spillovers are widely discussed, negative spillovers worth 
attention as well. Apart from the arguments presented by the military-industrial 
complex which focus on certain group interests, defense spending can in fact harm 
the overall wellbeing of the society. Because when a country’s defense spending is 
not proportional to the size of its economy, it will actually have a reverse effect. In 
case of developing or less developed countries, military expenditures are of 
secondary importance compared to more urgent socio-economic programs. If 
countries with limited economic resources choose to divert capital from other sectors 
just to develop a national defense industry it will stir up negative socio-economic 
outcomes. Instead what they can do is to use their limited resources for socially 
constructive ends. (Thee, 1981, p.44) By doing so, they will improve the welfare of 
the society effects which are felt directly by the people. 
 
Because of its desirable political reflections, which will be mentioned later in the 
chapter, even when importing arms is easy and affordable authorities might pursue 
an ambitious agenda to develop a self-sufficient industrial base. (Boutin, 2009, p.230) 
Defense spending of the Soviet Union was as twice as big as that of the United States 
and its economy only as half of it which contributed to the downfall of the Soviet 
Union. (Kolodziej, 2005, p.109) To depend merely on national resources increases the 
costs of production, prolonging the time to finish the product and cost technological 
compromises. (Boutin, 2009, p.236; Bitzinger, 2003, p.74) However, in such a case, 
states neglect the economic costs and benefits and focus on the domestic and 
international political status brought by owning a nationally developed arms.   
 
Even though states are motivated by certain political outcomes of nationalizing 
defense industry what they will have as an end product is a ¨less-than-impressive 
weapon systems.¨ (Bitzinger, 2003, p.74) For example, India wants to be a regional 
power and sees indigenous arms production capability as an important component 
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of that ever since the US arms embargo during the war with Pakistan which for India 
is a reminder of the importance of self-reliance. (Sanders, 1990, pp.15-98) In order 
to sustain its sovereignty in 1984 India established an institution called Aeronautical 
Development Agency to take care of light combat aircraft -Tejas program- and the 
agency explains its intention with the following statement: ¨History has taught us 
that there is a compulsion to achieve self-reliance in design, development and 
production of critical weapon systems to guard the sovereignty of our country.¨ 
(“History | Tejas - India’s Light Combat Aircraft,” n.d.) Having started in 1984, the 
project is still not finalized and its fate is unknown. Even if it will be finished, its costs 
to Indian economy will be great. Therefore, like in the case of India states might 
choose developing national arms even when it is not economically advantageous. 
 
2.2. Transnationalization of Arms Production 
Although countries are aware of the economic costs nationalizing the defense 
industry brings with it, the world economic system does not give them enough reason 
to be connected to the transnational production of arms. The second-tier countries 
of the periphery are connected to the first-tier countries of the core which are the 
primary arms producers in the world. The reality of transnationalization of defense 
technology since mid-1980’s brought into being this interwoven system of 
production. Even though many countries became part of this production chain, first-
tier countries benefit from the process more whereas profit and acquisition of the 
second-tiers are only marginal. Hence the process of transnationalization is critical in 
terms of understanding what pushed some countries to nationalize their defense 
production. 
 
Towards the end of the Cold War two superpowers started to withdraw back into 
their borders. Their former satellites reacted by strengthening their military as a 
precaution to future uncertainties and lack of trust in the superpowers’ commitment 
to intervene in case of a future conflict. (Buzan & Segal, 1994, p.9) So it was now up 
to them to provide their own national security and they initiated attempts to develop 
indigenous defense industries in order to decrease dependency. (Buzan & Segal, 
1994, pp.8-9) What makes things complicated for these countries which were 
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formerly dependent in terms of security is although they want to be independent 
producers of arms of defense, they became connected to the major suppliers through 
the economic system of the world.  
 
As demand for arms of defense started to decrease in producer countries with the 
de-escalation of conflict in the late 1980’s, defense companies realized their excess 
production capacity and saw foreign markets as a substitute for national ones. 
(Bitzinger, 1994, p.173) Bitzinger emphasizes that in order to gain access to these 
foreign markets defense companies initiated co-production programs which brought 
with it activities ranging from technology transfer, export license to production 
license. (Bitzinger, 1994, p.170) And he claims that through globalization Western 
dominance in arms market can be reduced but he does not say how. Later in an article 
published in 2003 Bitzinger (2003, p.74) compares this globalized arms industry to 
core-periphery model of international economic structure and even though he does 
not explicitly argue that the core exploits the periphery through transnationalization 
the article indicates the disadvantaged position of the latter in this relationship. 
 
At the core there are first-tier firms that produce high-tech items like ¨engines, 
sensors and electronics¨ which compose the most critical parts of the arms and at 
the periphery are second-tier firms that produce low-tech items which might be 
constituting bigger part of the arm but has low value. (Bitzinger, 2003, p.75) This 
transnationalization is said to reduce the technological gap between core and 
periphery by handing out some innovations to the second-tier firms. But countries of 
the periphery experience problems in the technology transfer and getting export and 
production licenses. Because the producers does not want to give up on the core 
technology and intellectual rights they have tried so hard to obtain. Handing out 
these critical components easily would mean loss of comparative advantage. 
However, through transnational production companies of the core amortize costs, 
reduce risks of developing a product alone, increase efficiency and economies of 
scale and enable penetration into new markets. (Moravcsik, 1991, p.35; Bitzinger, 
2003, p.68; Boutin, 2009, p.233)  
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Even though in the meanwhile peripheries improve by focusing on national industrial 
capabilities, they opt for developing ¨low risk¨ arms whereas continuing relying on 
¨foreign support for more advanced arms.¨ (Boutin, 2009, p.231) As argued by 
Kapstein this process only deliver such outcomes for the first-tier countries and the 
benefit of the rest is only marginal or none. Kapstein (1991, p.659) suggests that there 
are three options for arms production and first option is available for countries that 
have technological and economic resources which will enable them to autonomously 
produce arms. They might spread production across countries and take advantage of 
the low labor costs elsewhere but they have the capacity to pull it off on their own if 
they want to. Second option is for countries that have financial resources but lack 
technology. In that case they can engage in co-production and assemble for the major 
suppliers. Third option is for countries that have neither financial nor technological 
capacity which leave them no choice other than to import. 
 
This interconnectedness makes it hard for second-tier producers as well as for first-
tier producers to develop arms on their own. Although he mentions the benefits of 
globalization, Bitzinger (2003, p.76) accepts that it makes second-tier countries 
vulnerable to both political manipulation and economic realities of the global arms 
market. According to Boutin (2009, p.234) such pattern of industrialization through 
being a part of the global production chain is not compatible with the goal of national 
autonomy. Therefore, there are some second-tier producers that insist on preserving 
self-sufficiency and they have managed to find a place in the market with commercial 
production like Brazil did with regional jets and China did with missiles; and some 
other with engaging in niche production like Israel did with UAVs and reconnaissance. 
(Bitzinger, 2003, pp.64-68)  
 
If countries cannot ensure self-reliance in defense sector it is better to be connected 
to the global chain of production than not being able to produce anything. However, 
as opposed to what Bitzinger suggests multinational co-production does not 
circumvent Western hegemony. Because ¨Licensing production arrangements 
seldom transfer technology quickly, and do not represent a short path from 
dependence to independence.¨ (Buzan & Herring, 1998, p.41) On the other hand, 
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assembly of imported components make a country only specialized in a part of the 
production and does not deliver the overall technology. Although the picture seems 
so doomy, it improves the local producers to an extent and enhance their own 
capacity to design in the meantime. 
 
2.3. Use of Arms as a Political Tool 
Through the experiences they have gone through at one point in their histories, non-
supplier countries are aware of these dangers of dependence of their national 
defense on foreign countries. After the Second World War European countries were 
customers of American weapons. But as soon as Europe got back on its feet, it started 
improving its own capacity to manufacture the weapons it need. (Kapstein, 1991, 
p.660) Especially Britain and France followed independent strategies outside NATO, 
but even they did not miss the chance of coproducing in order to reduce the risks and 
costs in some fields. (Kapstein, 1991, pp.662-663) However, their multinational co-
development activities were not at the level of compromising their strategic 
advantage. France, Germany and Britain all refused to collaborate on production of 
arms of which they have comparative advantages. France is opposed to collaboration 
on fighter jets whereas Germany and Britain protect their domestic battle tank 
producers through refusing to cooperate with foreign firms. Nevertheless, they are 
open to collaborate in areas where they have a weak export position. (Moravcsik, 
1991, pp.37-38)  
 
Lack of industrial self-reliance means weapon flows will stop when the recipient 
country is going through a regional/national crises and when the country in question 
is vulnerable most to the internal/international threats. (Bitzinger, 1995, p.256; 
Boutin, 2009, p.229) Turkey and Brazil are countries that suffered from arms supply 
embargoes during Carter administration, and Taiwan and South Africa too went 
through an embargo period which encouraged all of these countries to build their 
own national defense industries. (Brauer, 1998, p.5) When this relation between 
supplier and recipient countries are taken into account, supplier states have a lot of 
leverages in their hands. They have the chance to choose the quality of weapons they 
are exporting and the freedom to decide to whom they are exporting. (Neuman, 
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1988, p.1046) Furthermore, they can ¨exploit political leverage they have with 
developing state customers” just like the embargo decision of the US with the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran which overthrow a friendly regime to the Americans. (Boutin, 2009, 
p.229) Therefore, apart from ensuring a state’s own security, having a strong defense 
industry can be used as a tool for such countries to steer the outcome of conflicts in 
favor of their foreign policies. 
 
As can be seen, the reason why self-reliance or reduced reliance on procured arms 
of defense is preferred by countries is because it strengthens national political 
independence. (Bitzinger, 2003, p.36) Moreover, once countries get their hands on 
such a power they know that they too can be regional powers influential over other 
countries. Hence, producing an authentic arms technology indicates to a political 
motive of a country as it can be used to exert influence. (Cited by Kızmaz, Brozska & 
Lock, 1992, p.145) William W. Keller (1995, p.166) says that during Bush 
administration arms transfer policy was seen as a tool of foreign policy ¨that could 
be selectively applied to accommodate geo-strategic circumstances prevailing in the 
region to which the weapons or military technology were destined... It was driven by 
calculations of military balance, political cachet, and economic return.¨ Hence, 
supplier countries’ transfer of arms is not unconditional, it is a result of certain 
political calculations of the supplier.  
 
As power is an important asset of a country which can be measured by military as 
well as by economic capabilities, it also gives a prestigious status to the country that 
obtains it. (Gilpin, 1983, p.32) In other words, showing the country’s power through 
its capabilities in military technology contributes to ¨its status as a great power.¨ 
(Bitzinger, 2003, p.98) During the Cold War, it was the case between two 
superpowers. They competed in military power and strengthened their client states 
by providing them with arms. (Kolodziej, 2005, p.102; Buzan & Herring, 1998, p.33) 
Arms transfer on the one hand military assistance on the other assures creation of 
client states which pursue policies in favor of their patron. Even today, powerful 
states do not have to fight wars on the ground as long as they arm and back up local 
groups or states which would turn the result of the war to their favor. Therefore, E. 
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H. Carr said that prestige is ¨important because if your strength is recognized you can 
generally achieve your aims without having to use it.¨ (quoted in Gilpin, 1983, p.31) 
Whereas first-tier countries enjoy the benefit of determining the outcomes of the 
conflicts as they decide whom to give weapons, second-tiers as the receiver of the 
arms are the ones whose actions are decided. Therefore, self-reliance is important 
since it ensures that the country deals with the threat without external involvement. 
(Neuman, 1994, p.104) 
 
Although liberal economic rules apply to companies in the Western market, industrial 
self-reliance in defense is a priority that cannot be left to the hands of foreign 
companies. Hence, even in capitalist markets field of defense is exempt from the free 
market economy and closed to competition. Foreigners are discouraged from 
entering and companies in general are owned or supported by the state. Since self-
sufficiency in arms of defense is accepted as the most reliable way for providing 
national security, its importance far surpasses the free market. (Bitzinger, 1994, p.72) 
Moreover, since political authorities see the defense industry in terms of its 
contribution to national autonomy and political stature, competition and free market 
are not options approved by politicians in this sector. (Kapstein, 1991, p.675; Boutin, 
2009, p.230) As a result, it pushes governments to put restrictions on foreign 
companies and support the local firms even when it is not economically viable. 
(Boutin, 2009, p.230) ¨For example, during the integration of European Union, most 
of states which have sophisticated defense industrial base such as France, the UK, 
and Germany strongly have resisted the idea of common defense market for the 
protection of their markets.¨ (Kızmaz, 2007, p.6) 
 
The grounds at which first-tier countries approach transnationalization with 
suspicion is also discouraging second-tier countries from the process which would 
take away their freedom of movement. In order to decrease the ¨political 
vulnerability to supplier pressure¨ some countries opt for carrying out independent 
production as much as possible and so as to maintain their neutral policy they opted 
for self-sufficiency during the Cold War. (Buzan and Herring, 1998, p.45) 
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A restriction on the supply of arms, non-producer states argue, they would 
become second-class states, unable to match the military forces of producers 
and relegated to politically unacceptable category of those judged incapable of 
being allowed to manage their own affairs. (Buzan & Herring, 1998, p.36) 
 
For the same reasons, Neuman points out that ¨imported equipment is always less 
secure than the domestically produced equivalent because a country’s enemy may 
more easily gain access to it and thereby glean sensitive information.¨ (Neuman, 
1994, pp.104-105) It makes any country question the viability of leaving its defense 
to the hands of another country.  
 
2.4. Trade-offs of Developing a National Defense Industry 
Although he was pro-self-sufficiency in defense Louis XIV’s chief minister Jean-
Baptiste Colbert admitted that spending on war undermines ¨the real source of 
power - economic activity.¨ (Moravcsik, 1991, p.26) Moravcsik (1991, p.39) states 
that autarkic policies in defense sector might cause economic disadvantages in the 
short-run arising from not specializing in the development of a specific product and 
buying the rest from others who specialize in those particular items. This he refers to 
as ¨autarky-efficiency dilemma.¨ It is a huge quandary for a country because it wants 
to be independent in every sense but producing every single arm it needs cannot 
guarantee that. Because what it does to ensure full self-reliance actually divides up 
the limited capital and quality personnel among different projects. This prevents 
reaching perfection in a single item that could have given comparative advantage to 
that country in the international market.  
 
Even though Viotti (1994, p.4) underlines the economic benefits of defense spending 
he points out a trade-off by saying that those expenditures might be achieved at the 
expense of other public expenditures. Spending on modern arms cuts back on the 
immediate needs of the population if country has scarce economic resources and as 
a result of that it faces a trade-off between military and social spending. (Ram, 1993, 
pp.23-50; Buzan and Herring, 1998, p.49) Furthermore, Gilpin (1981, pp.168-169) 
mentions that the cost of protection is increasing since the modern weapons are 
more complicated and expensive which in return forces states to invest more in their 
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defense diminishing the resources they were to use in other sectors. This is why 
sustaining a strong military puts a non-negligible financial burden on both the 
economies of developed and developing countries. (Sivard, 1981, p.35) 
 
Neuman points out that scholars who stress the economic costs of military industry 
refer to the scarcity of inputs like capital stocks, technical skill, work force, raw 
material that are being canalized into making weapons. (Neuman, 1994, p.102) When 
already limited resources are used for making or buying weapons, it cuts down on 
the financing of other public expenditures which would make conditions better for 
the society like improvements in health services. As the population of a country 
grows so does its need for health services which makes investments in health 
essential for the wellbeing of the public. Same thing applies to other social 
expenditures like education, transportation and housing. However, the military 
threat is not directly proportional to the size of the population, so its growth, unlike 
other public expenditures, does not do good to society’s welfare. (Sivard, 1981, p.36) 
For example, military R&D decreases the scope of R&D on the civilian sector which 
directly affects development of the country. Employing skilled personnel in the 
defense industry creates a scarcity of highly qualified workforce for civilian sectors. It 
is especially worse for the LDCs which have limited skilled personnel. (Thee, 1981, 
p.46; Ram, 1993, p.26) Regarding the problem, International Peace Bureau remarks 
in its 2012 report that: 
 
(The issue) is also about the channeling of so many of our finest scientific minds 
into careers that promote military, rather than civilian, solutions. Wouldn’t we 
advance more rapidly in the global fight against HIV/AIDS, or in tackling water 
scarcity or climate change, if even a small portion of the military’s immense 
store of brain power were made available for such programs? (Archer & 
Annette, 2012, p.33) 
 
The opponents of defense build-up point out the valuable human capital which could 
easily have been trained for and invested in civilian sectors and might do better 
contribution to the nation as well as to humanity. 
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Other than stealing the skilled people from non-defensive sectors, military industry 
also makes a negative effect on the environment because of ¨experimental 
explosions, toxic discharges, and use of wide range of non-renewable resources.¨ 
(Ram, 1993, p.27) Just like other civilian sectors, environmental problems too need 
to be taken care of through research. (Thee, 1981, p.46) Furthermore, the 
environment could have been deteriorated less if it was not for nuclear or other 
military tests. 
 
These are the reasons why the critiques see the spending on military industry as a 
drain on the economy of, especially third world countries. (Gilpin, 1981, p.169; 
Neuman, 1994, pp.102-103) Allocation of resources to military use aggravates the 
economy of developing nations more because those resources ¨could have been 
used for civilian purposes, either to accelerate growth and modernization in such 
fields as industry, agriculture, and transport or to raise the standard of living and 
improve the quality of life.¨ (Thee, 1981, pp.50-51) 
 
While diversion of resources cost country’s socio-economic development, it also 
creates a balance of payment problem since these countries have to import the 
expensive arms of defense. Whereas suppliers draw the money into their economy 
as a result of the transaction, non-suppliers lose big part of their already limited 
economic resources which on the international level widens the gap between rich 
and poor countries. On the other hand, even if they do not pay for the weapons and 
the weapons are being delivered as a part of the foreign military aid country of 
destination still has to pay for the additional costs such as maintenance, spare parts, 
and after a while for modernization. (Thee, 1981, p.50) Moreover, supplier countries 
amortize the costs of development in the long-term since importing countries 
¨subsidize military R&D in the arms-exporting countries.¨ (Thee, 1981, p.50) For 
example, Turkey made an agreement with Russia to buy S-400 missiles. (“Türkiye 
Rusya’dan S-400 alıyor,” 2017) But Russia is working on the next generation of 
missiles which is called S-500. (Sharkov, 2017) With the money Turkey pays Russia 
will already be developing the next technology. So soon after Turkey gets S-400’s, 
they will be outdated. This relation between supplier and buyer countries 
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perpetuates the position of the arms exporters vis-a-vis other countries in 
technological lead. 
 
Whereas military spending deteriorates the situation in LDCs, it is not the same for 
arms producers. Hence, Buzan and Herring (1998, p.107) say that the strategy of 
taking the military way is applicable only for the arms producer countries: 
 
This technique is especially useful in a country like the United States, where 
Keynesian measures of economic stimulation might, in themselves, attract 
ideological opposition. It is easier to get tax-payers to consent to subsidies for 
high-technology industries if they are justified as necessary to the military 
security of the country... Military spending tends to be less controversial than 
welfare measures and other public works, and government are more in control 
of the variables that govern the need of military measures. The international 
system may oblige by providing threats that are real enough to be exaggerated 
if the need to do so for economic reasons arises. 
 
However this does not discourage non-producing countries from expanding their 
arms production capabilities because their dependence on foreign arms brings them 
back to the problem of use of it as a political leverage by the supplier country. 
Technology cannot always be bought as states regulate and sometimes can limit the 
transactions of their companies with foreign states due to political interests. The 
export license system protects the foreign policy interests of country. It does so by 
preventing the undesirable political effects which can be generated by the sale of 
arms on purely economic concerns. (Buzan & Herring, 1998, p.47) 
 
All in all, literature shows that domestic structure and action-reaction model explains 
the reasons for development of national defense industry. Whereas domestic 
structure sheds a light on the motivations and rationalizations of the local actors such 
as politicians and military-industrial complex; action-reaction model looks at the 
macro level and clarifies what the international factors that propel countries to 
strengthen their military build-up are. Although there are certain effects of 
nationalizing the defense industry, the literature shows that analyzing countries by 
looking at the internal and external dynamics and their own economic structure, 
which may or may not be strong enough to endure the costs of national defense 
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projects, is necessary. Hence, in the rest of the thesis I will be looking into these 
variables and how effective they are in the nationalization of the defense industry in 
Turkey. 
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CHAPTER III 
APPLICATION OF ACTION-REACTION MODEL 
 
This chapter consists of the geographical factors that affect Turkey's security, and 
hence, Turkey’s perceived need for more expenditure on arms and for nationalization 
of the arms industry. By analyzing the regional variables explained in the chapter, I 
intend to show that Turkey's attempts in military defense is in large part a response 
to the geopolitical dynamics of the region. Turkey tried to maintain relations on an 
economic level when it could, but when the recent conditions required it to move to 
more security-based approach it started prioritizing defense. In that respect, Turkey 
is not different from other countries in trying to maintain its security. What makes its 
initiatives different is its dedication in pursuing a policy of nationalization which is 
totally congruent with the distrust Turkey had developed as a result of its encounters 
with countries in its geography that brought conflicting interests with its allies to the 
surface. Lack of trust in allies or as Buzan and Segal (1994, p.9) called it ¨diminishing 
security commitments of superpowers¨ is not widely covered in the literature. Nor is 
it a part of the action-reaction model. However, the conflicting actions or inactions 
of allies create the reaction of the country in question to improve its own defense. 
Hence it is an important variable that should be taken into account. Since the attitude 
of allies can influence the regional politics which may, as a result, bring on an interest-
dilemma I will elaborate on them together. 
 
Turkey's move from a relatively peaceful period which enabled cooperation with the 
region to a period in which increased arms race and threats affected its security more 
is a sign that its initiatives in the defense industry are reactive. So as to show that and 
how action-reaction model works I will start with explaining how Turkey acted 
historically in the presence and absence of threats. Then I will proceed with regional 
arms race and states/terror groups that push Turkey to activate a process of defense 
industrialization. 
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3.1. Turkey in the Regional Conjuncture 
3.1.1. A Historical Outlook at Turkey’s Security Perspective 
Turkey is located in a geography where it is surrounded by countries it had conflicts 
with in the past owing to its imperial history that is followed by the nation-state 
building process. The ongoing years did not witness major disputes with neighbors as 
the newly founded republic was busy with its internal affairs such as the construction 
of national institutions and economy. And so were the other states which gained 
independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's first major decision 
to choose a side and take military action in a foreign land was not about a regional 
issue. It was the decision to join Korean War. However, it was made with a political 
calculation; if Turkey was to join the NATO alliance and get under its security 
umbrella, it had to pay the price by fighting alongside the allies. Before joining the 
war, Turkey applied and got rejected by NATO twice. And only after sending its 
soldiers to fight in Korean War it was accepted to the organization in 1952. (Oran, 
2013a, pp. 543-545)  
 
Apart from Turkey's involvement in Korean War which was the result of a strategic 
calculation on the part of Turkey, the major problem that Turkey had to face 
afterward was the Cyprus issue. When two communities in the island divorced in 
1963, Cyprus became the main foreign policy issue for Turkey. The idea of 
intervention was halted because of the Johnson letter which owes its existence to 
the efforts of the Greek-American lobby that inspired the writing of such letter in 
favor of the Greeks.1 (Landau, 1974, pp.51-52) In the letter, Turkey was harshly 
warned that it cannot use the military equipment provided by the US in case of an 
intervention. In 1974, after 10 year from the letter, Greek attacks on Turks living on 
the island culminated in Turkey’s intervention as a guarantor power. As the interests 
                                                                                                                                                      
1 Numerous cables, telephone calls, letters, and memos reached the White House during the first half 
of 1964; nearly all of them were designed to influence Presidential policy towards Cyprus. Much of the 
correspondence stressed the alleged discrimination or persecution of Greeks in Turkey. A White House 
Office ¨route slip¨ stated that as of June 26, 1964, 2,598 letters concerning this matter had been 
received at the White House! Thus this lobbying-by-communication relied on the sheer amount of 
correspondence and intended to impress the White House with the ability of Greek-Americans to 
mobilize a grassroots campaign; the deluge of communications was one of the main reasons for the 
success. (Landau, 1974, p.52) 
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of the USA was not congruent with those of Turkey, two countries were on a collision 
course and the American congress issued an arms embargo against Turkey as warned 
by the US 10 years ago. The embargo relied on the principles of the Truman doctrine 
and Public Law 75 which prevented any recipient country to use the delivered 
equipment other than the stated purposes and warned that the assistance would be 
terminated if it was seen as unnecessary or undesirable.2 
 
The embargo decision hit Turkey really hard. For so long, Turkey had seen the United 
States as its staunch ally. Having the political decision of intervention in mind on the 
one hand, and seeing the withdrawal of support from its major partner on the other 
hand, Turkey was pushed into the corner. It was a reminder for Turkey that its 
security will not be protected if it does not have its own means and its allies does not 
have the motivation to protect it. The US had acted according to its own national 
interests when it issued the Truman doctrine and also when the President wrote the 
famous Johnson Letter which soured the relations between the two countries. 
Similarly, Turkey too wanted to follow its national interests by intervening. But for a 
country which depends on another state and arms provided by it for its security, it is 
not easy to do so. The problems it encountered with the US after having taken the 
intervention decision, made Turkey think that buying from countries other than the 
US is imperative. (Uslu, 2000, p.209) But no state can be another’s unchanging ally so 
it did not take long for Turkey to realize how important it is to establish an 
autonomous military industry.  
 
With the embargo, delivery of military equipment worth more than $200 million was 
cancelled. (Durmaz, 2014, p.23) When the political scene changed in the US during 
                                                                                                                                                      
2 ¨payments when made shall be credited to such countries in accounts established for the purpose¨ 
(section 2) 
¨the government requesting such assistance shall agree (a) to permit free access of United States 
government officials for the purpose of observing whether such assistance is utilized effectively and 
in accordance with the undertakings of the recipient government¨(section 3) 
¨The president is directed to withdraw any or all aid authorized herein under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(2) if the security Council finds, or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished 
by the United Nations makes the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable 
(4) if the President finds that any of the assurances given pursuant to section 3 are not being carried 
out.¨ (Public Law 75, 1947) 
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the crisis with Ford becoming the president, he followed the political decisions of the 
Kissinger who did not see any good in embargo since he believed it would only do 
harm to the relations with Turkey in the long run. (Durmaz, 2014, p.23) But the 
strength of the Greek-American lobby, and the decisiveness of the Congress 
prevented any attempt to lift the embargo the only exception was the decision of the 
Congress to send F-4 aircraft materials, payment of which was already made. (Binder 
in Durmaz, 2014, p.23) As a reaction against the American decision, Turkey used the 
only card it has against the US and retaliated by closing military installations in its 
territory used by the US. For the US it meant a loss of intelligence and leverages 
provided by having bases close to the Soviet Union. 
 
Later, F104s were taken from Italy and West Germany (Durmaz, 2014, p.49) but 
procuring from different suppliers in order to decrease dependence on the US could 
not be the solution as it is never for sure that the interests of Turkey with any other 
possible supplier would not clash in any future conflict which would result in another 
embargo. Hence, new initiatives took place. In the following years of the embargo 
Aselsan, Havelsan, TAI, Roketsan, Aspilsan, Isbir were established in order to meet 
the demands of the Turkish Armed Forces which was proven to be lacking the 
necessary materials that can be used without having to answer to anyone during the 
four years of the embargo. Although these initial steps for making modern and 
technological defense industry were important, it was only the beginning. The 
investments made during the post-embargo period were not sufficient as Turkey 
adopted the foreign defense technologies instead of investing in the R&D itself. 
(Durmaz, 2014, p.57) 
 
During 80’s and 90’s Turkey had to deal with its internal problems starting with the 
coup d’état. It was a military regime that was ruling the country but did not do any 
improvement towards developing a nationally self-sufficient defense industry. When 
military regime left its place to a civilian government, it was again not easy to focus 
on a national defense strategy and strive for a self-reliant industry since the political 
instabilities, coalition regimes and economic problems of 1990’s did not leave any 
room for bold initiatives of the state. In that respect, a stable political environment 
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provided by a long-lasting one party government with the policies it has undertaken 
in the area of defense are going to be covered in the next chapter. The regional 
political atmosphere which is conducive to nationalization efforts and 
complementary to this domestic political structure will be covered in the rest of this 
chapter. 
 
3.1.2. Changing Conjuncture Boosting Economic Integration with the Region 
Looking at the historical process, Turkey has generally focused on internal politics and 
preferred to have a neutral stance on the regional issues or acted along with Western 
partners which it closely associated itself with. From a Western security perspective, 
Turkey was seen as an important asset. Due to its geographical location and identity, 
Turkey was fit to be a buffer between the ¨chaotic¨ East and the West. While the 
West depended on Turkey for security, Turkey too depended on its Western allies 
against external threats. Even at times when Turkey used military means, it had to 
pay the price by being exposed to an arms embargo in the case of Cyprus intervention 
which showed Turkey the danger of being reliant on procured arms for its defense. 
As a result of this Turkey learned its lesson and that acting on its own in case of future 
conflicts would not be a feasible solution. In general during Cold War Turkey mostly 
relied on NATO and on the US whereas they saw Turkey as a shield that would protect 
them against the communist camp.  
 
Up until 2000's Turkey most of the time steered clear of the regional issues and center 
of its attention was domestic problems. When it involved in regional politics, it did 
not act unilaterally. Rather, it had chosen to act along with its allies which was either 
the US and Europe or the Soviet Union depending on the conjuncture. While usually 
focusing on its relations with the West, Turkey turned its back to the MENA its 
cultural heritage zone. For decades, it did not take advantage of its historical and 
cultural ties with the countries in the region that is stemming from its imperial past. 
Turkish elite adopted a security-centered approach towards the region which had 
only started to change in the 21st century with the changing domestic political scene. 
(Kalın, 2012, p.11) Henri Barkey says that Turkey was also seen as a military ally by 
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Europe and the US but the change in the conjuncture propelled Turkey to reassert 
itself through its economic and political power. (Kalın, 2012, p.8)  
 
The change of scene and perceptions in Turkey, and the changing realities of the 
world encouraged and motivated Turkey to increase its cooperation with the 
countries in its region. Turkey decided to increase its zone of influence through 
economic integration which is its biggest asset in a geography that is willing to 
purchase its new line of products. (Fidan, 2013, pp.91-92) Turkey used its cultural and 
historical ties with the region to forge a foreign policy around economic connections. 
Although it forged economic relations with the countries in the Middle East its 
connections were limited. However, as far as Turkish economy was concerned it was 
in the interest of statesmen to do their best to protect the bilateral trade relations. 
 
The newly adopted trade-centered regional policies of Turkey would be damaged by 
any kind of geographical conflict. For this reason, the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003 was worrisome from the Turkish perspective. Iraq had become a major 
destination of Turkish goods after 2001 crisis which helped it to restore economic 
order, and an invasion would distort everything. (Oran, 2013b, p.403) Moreover, 
American occupation corresponded to the change of the political authority in Turkey 
which was willing to engage in its region through even more economic integration. 
Hence, Turkey did everything in its power to prevent an invasion which would shatter 
the regional balance, bring into existence a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and 
damage Turkey’s economic relations. (Oran, 2013b, p.406) When Turkey’s attempts 
were unsuccessful, it wanted to make sure that it was not going to be pushed out of 
the Iraqi market during the reconstruction process. The Parliament did not approve 
the memorandum to send Turkish soldiers to fight in Iraq, and open Turkish air space 
and ports for coalition forces. But since Turkey was the most developed country with 
the largest economy among the neighbors of Iraq, it was the most reliable destination 
for the reconstruction of the country from the American perspective. (Oran, 2013b, 
p.408) Hence, the US gave the green light to Turkey by including it into the process 
of reconstruction. As a result, Turkey’s trade with Iraq improved.  
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Figure 3.1. Turkey’s Exports to Iraq (million USD)3 
 
It was not only Iraq but also other Middle Eastern and North African countries Turkey 
started establishing economic relations with. This gave Turkey an opportunity to 
diversify its customer base which was predominantly composed of buyers from the 
West. After broadening its clientele by opening up to the East, Turkey wanted to 
make more profit out of these transactions. In order to boost the economic activities 
with the countries in the region, it has undertaken some measures. Turkey initiated 
the process of eliminating the visa requirements which could not be realized with the 
European countries and established preferential trade regimes along with free-trade 
zones.4 These were to facilitate the flow of goods and eliminate the barriers to trade 
that are being disrupted by bureaucratic procedures. The main reason behind 
Turkey’s smooth transition of the 2009 recession is these markets thanks to which 
Turkey was slightly touched by the crisis while the Western economies were harshly 
stricken. (Fidan, 2013, p.92) Hence, transactions with Middle Eastern countries is 
important for Turkey’s economic revenues. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
3 Source: Ministry of Economy, 2017 
4 Turkey was not benefiting enough from that bilateral relation because of the Customs Union which 
put Turkey in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis the countries of the European Union. Although Turkey 
had signed Free Trade Agreements with countries both in Europe and elsewhere in Latin America, 
Africa and Middle East, the ones with the European countries were cancelled due to their accession 
to the European Union. (Ministry of Economy, 2017) 
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Figure 3.2. Turkey’s exports to MENA and Europe-Central Asia5 
 
Economic activities were not only promoted at the state level but private enterprises 
were too encouraged to make businesses elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa and 
Asia. Official visits of the President, Prime Minister, Trade Minister was and is still 
being accompanied by businessmen in different sectors. (Kalın, 2012, p.18) This 
initiated the investment of Turkish businessmen through winning the trust of foreign 
country officials and as a result opening up ways for them to do business. Such 
attempts increased Turkey’s volume of trade with these geographies, contributing to 
Turkey’s GDP and development, and in return making the economic connection with 
these regions even more indispensable. 
 
This agenda of Turkey which is prioritizing economic integration is seen to be a win-
win game that empowers both parties involved. When Europe’s role in Turkey’s 
export market weakened, that of the Middle East gained strength. In 2000 Turkey’s 
export to the Middle Eastern countries were 2.5 billion dollars. (Silkroad 
Development Agency, 2011, p.96) After 8 years in 2008 it grew 10 times larger and 
reached up to 25.4 billion dollars and in 2016 it became 31.3 billion dollars. When the 
overall share of the region is taken into account there is no doubt that it has increased 
in terms of exports by country groups. 
                                                                                                                                                      
5 Source: WorldBank 2017: 
http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/2015/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/E
CS/Product/all-groups 
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Figure 3.3. Share of MENA and Europe-Central Asia within Turkey’s exports6 
 
Although the MENA has always come second in Turkey's export list, its share has 
increased considerably during the period when Turkey closely cooperated with the 
region. When a relatively peaceful and economically prosperous atmosphere for 
Turkey was observed on the regional level, on the internal level the struggle which 
was carrying on since 1980's was in a thawing period thanks to the peace process. 
Initiated in 2009 peace process brought an internal political stability to Turkey. A 
couple of internal and external tranquility created an environment which contributed 
a great amount to Turkey's economic developments. 
 
Turkey's major concerns changed due to the shifting regional dynamics which obliged 
Turkey to make security its major concern with regards to its relations with the 
countries in the region. (Mercan, 2016, p.101) Because safety comes first and a 
country cannot have a functioning economy if it does not have a security apparatus 
that protects the market and the investors. Hence, Turkey's reaction to build a 
national defense industry is affected deeply by the regional arms race and relations 
of Turkey with different actors in the region, which will be covered in the rest of the 
chapter. 
 
3.2. Regional Arms Race 
The question why Turkey is determined to build a deterrent and defensive power has 
several reasons one of which is the arms race in the region. Arms building in the 
                                                                                                                                                      
6 Source: World Bank 2016 
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region has a long history that dates back to 1973's oil crisis, after which oil rich Arab 
countries started spending their petrodollars on military build-up. Later in 1979 when 
the Islamic Revolution changed the regime in Iran, Iran became a country strongly 
associated with Shiism aspiring to be a regional power. Against it, Saudi Arabia shined 
as the guardian of Holy lands but representing Sunni Islam. Although religious in 
essence the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has turned into a geopolitical 
competition. (Ighani, 2016, p.1) Hence, the sectarian conflict became the issue 
around which the regional arms race evolved. Later on, another parameter added to 
the strengthening of arms regional arms race: Arab uprisings. I will be covering both 
of these factors in this section. 
 
3.2.1. Sectarian Conflict 
Apart from Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt too were centers of power in the 
region. Egypt had relatively prosperous times and was more influential especially 
during 1960’s and 70’s. After being pushed away as a result of its deal with Israel in 
1978, Egypt turned even more into its internal affairs with Arab uprisings and regime 
changes and is now out of the play. Iraq, on the other hand, was a regional power 
holder during the rule of Saddam. With the American invasion in 2003, Iraq too was 
crossed out of the equation. Another regional actor Syria as well is confined to its 
domestic problems after the uprisings started which then evolved into a civil war in 
2011. This is not to say that these countries are not taking part in the regional arms 
race but it shows that Iran and Saudi Arabia are the spearheads of the race which 
revolve around sectarianism.  
 
The elimination of a Sunni authority in Iraq after its occupation gave more of a wiggle 
room to Iran due to a power vacuum during which it can exert its influence over the 
Shia population of Iraq. On the other hand, Alawi-dominated Assad regime that 
gained strength with the civil war which closed the gap between Iran and Hezbollah 
in Lebanon formed a de facto Shia crescent. Such events fortified the Shia camp by 
bringing these countries closer. The ongoing struggle in Syrian territory gives strength 
to the sectarian conflict. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has the economically powerful 
sheikhdoms of Gulf and its military arsenal which it invests more of its GDP than any 
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other country in the world.7 Whenever there is a regional problem Iran and Saudi 
Arabia always take opposite sides (Iran with Shiites and Saudi Arabia with Sunnis) 
seen in the cases of Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, and their support for proxy groups 
and these groups’ eventual success necessitate even more arms. 
 
Due to the international sanctions against Iran, compared to other countries in the 
region its record of military expenditures is relatively low. But Russia steps in in cases 
of Assad regime needing help which fills the void when Iran cannot. During the period 
from 2008 to 2012, Russia supplied 71% of Syria’s weaponry whereas Iran provided 
14% of it. (Fleurant & Perlo-Freeman, 2013) According to SIPRI (Fleurant & Perlo-
Freeman, 2016, p.5), in 2015 Iran’s military spending was $10.3 billion whereas Saudi 
Arabia’s was $87.2 billion. This facilitates Saudi Arabia to send arms to Syria whereas 
Iran is mostly sending its Revolutionary Guards Corps and less amount of weaponry 
to the regime in comparison to Saudis. (Ighani, 2016, p.4) This continuing rivalry 
increases the threat perceived by other countries in the geography especially in the 
Gulf and pulls them into the regional arms race. (Fleurant & Perlo-Freeman, 2013, 
p.8) Because, ¨[Despite low oil prices,] countries in the region continued to order 
more weapons in 2016, perceiving them as crucial tools for dealing with conflicts and 
regional tensions.¨ (“Increase in arms transfers driven by demand in the Middle East 
and Asia, says SIPRI ”, 2017) 
 
3.2.2. Arab Uprisings 
The uprisings that started as a democratic revolutionary movement in the region 
soon after turned into a power struggle in each state where the rulers saw the 
vulnerability of their regimes and started empowering themselves with security 
policies. This resulted in further investments in military power which had already 
been higher than other regions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
7 According to Trends in World Military Expenditure 2015 by SIPRI, as of 2015 %13.7 of its GDP is spent 
on military by Saudi Arabia 
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Table 3.1. Military Expenditure by Country in the Middle East (US$ million) (Source: 
SIPRI 20168) 
Country 2011 2014 
Bahrain 1126 1475 
Egypt 4831 5085 
Iraq 6545 9516 
Israel 15950 18106 
Jordan 1812 1550 
Kuwait 5705 5942 
Lebanon 1851 2270 
Oman 7018 10951 
Saudi Arabia 53062 80762 
Turkey 16875 17770 
UAE 19980 22755 
 
When we look at the situation from a regional scale the arms race in the Middle East 
is very telling both with its volume before and after the uprisings. SIPRI reports show 
that the Middle East comes second in the transfer of the global share of conventional 
arms with 17% after Asia and Oceania in the period of 2008-2012. (Fleurant & Perlo-
Freeman, 2013) In 2011-2015, the Middle East is again the runner-up this time with 
25% of worldwide arms transfer which shows the increase after the uprisings. 
(Fleurant & Perlo-Freeman, 2016) Furthermore, the militarization of the Middle East 
is noticeable not because the rest of the world stopped investing in arms of defense 
but relative to the population military expenditures in the region are very high. (Stork, 
2016) 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Military Expenditure per capita by Region (million USD) 9 
                                                                                                                                                      
8 Data for Syria, Qatar, North Yemen is missing 
9 Source: SIPRI 2016 
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While countries started spending more on their military, some like Syria, Yemen 
drifted into civil wars. When America withdrew from Iraq, it left a weak state that 
was divided into three. (Tziarras, 2015) The administrative problems encountered by 
Iraq after its occupation which continues up until today and turned it into a torn 
country is also seen in Syria where the central government is not the only authority. 
And when Syrian uprisings evolved into a civil war because the government did not 
want to step back, another power vacuum came into existence. Now, Syrian territory 
too is divided where Assad forces, Syrian Democratic Forces, and Free Syrian Army 
exist. Yemen is no different in terms of internal conflict. Since the start of the civil 
war in 2015, the country is divided between Houthi and pro-Saleh forces versus Hadi 
government creating in the region another turmoil. ("Yemen crisis," 2017)10 
 
This hectic environment which created a power vacuum in the territory of Iraq and 
Syria brought into being a terrorist group called ISIS in 2014 which is settled in Iraqi - 
Syrian lands. In December 2016 area controlled by ISIS was around 60,400 square km 
dropped from 91,531 square km in January 2015. ("Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq 
and Syria in maps," 2017 & Strack, 2015) 
 
 
Map 3.1. Influence Zones of Insurgents and States across Southern Border of 
Turkey11 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 Although regionally presenting a security dilemma, Yemen is a case that is far from bringing a direct 
threat to Turkey. As this chapter of the thesis is about how Turkey reacted with its defense industry 
to the regional developments, my main focus will be on Iraq and Syria. 
11 Source: IHS Conflict Monitor (16 January 2017) 
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An anti-ISIS coalition force is fighting the group with land and aerial operations. 
Although ISIS has lost control of some of the major cities it had hold of, it has a strong 
international appeal due to its use of modern day technology. It manages to attract 
people not only from the region but also especially from Europe. Since it terrorized 
major European countries including Turkey, many states are involved in the coalition 
to fight it. ISIS presents a challenge not only for the countries in the region but also 
for the countries in the other part of the world like the US since it poses a threat to 
the US interests in the geography.  
 
3.2.3. Going Deep into the Regional Rivalries 
Yıldırım et, al. (2005) argues that military expenditures depend on military 
expenditures of neighbors as well as on internal/external conflicts. While the major 
powers in the region are involved in an arms race, Turkey cannot be indifferent to it. 
Just like other countries it is affected and threatened by the increased volume of arms 
that adds up to regional tensions which concern Turkey closely as the war in Syria 
escalates. According to the SIPRI reports arms transfer to the Middle Eastern 
countries increased by 61% 2006-2010 and 2011-2015. In the same period, arms 
import of Iraq increased by 83% whereas Egyptian arms imports grew by 37%, that 
of UAE by 35% and of Saudi Arabia by 275%. (SIPRI, 2015) For some countries in the 
region due to lack of transparency, the figures are not announced but the overall 
picture shows an increase in the arms investment in the region. 
 
A question asking why Turkey did not adopt a security loaded perspective towards 
the Middle East earlier where arms race has been going on since the 70’s might come 
to minds. Before Turkey was involved in this decades-long arms race, it was engaged 
closely with the West seeing no point in turning its face to the East and later in 2000’s 
it had the conjunctural advantage of leading an economic integration with the region 
since this time it did not perceive a major threat directly targeting its security. 
Moreover, the extent of threat coming from the region was never this wide until the 
piling up of major problems namely an unstable Iraq, breakdown of relations with 
Israel, Arab uprisings, emergence of ISIS, Syrian civil war along with the rise of the 
PKK that damaged the trade centered relations with the region which had created 
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the restored soul of the relations with the Middle East after decades of distance. The 
degree of Turkey’s previous connections with the region and geographical proximity 
to conflict-ridden war zones made it later inevitable for Turkey to make security high 
on the agenda. Before the start of civil war Turkey was discussing clearing landmines 
in the Syrian border, now with the threats emanating from the war a wall along the 
border is under construction.  
 
As a result of the conflicts in the geography which started jeopardizing Turkey's 
security profoundly, and the conflict of interest it experienced with its allies made 
the development of a national defense industry even more urgent. Ever since the 
American invasion of Iraq, things have not been settled down in the Middle East. 
Invasion of Iraq is a critical turning point because the instability of the regime in Iraq 
puts regional security at risk. First and foremost, it divided Iraq into three with the 
Kurdish regional government in the North which Turkey looked with suspicion 
because of the possible effect of it on Kurdish independence movement inside 
Turkey. Secondly, the sectarian politics of the new formation was to create hostility 
which would shatter security of both Iraq and the surrounding countries. Starting 
with the crisis in Iraq, several other regional developments made Turkey question the 
security policies it has been pursuing which was highly dependent on foreign arms of 
defense. Although 1974 crisis hit Turkey hard and pushed it to go national, in 2003 
only a quarter of the necessary pieces of equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces 
could be met domestically. So it took another major blow on its security before 
Turkey realized it was the high time it took its defense into its own hands. 
 
The conjunctural change brought forth by the new threats directly targeting Turkey’s 
security forced it to change its policies. But the process of nationalization did not 
happen overnight. Turkey proceeded step by step to develop its own defense of arms 
and with every crisis it met in the region, it has undertaken a solution to solve the 
problem. This increased the level of indigenousness of the defense industry gradually 
which made it reach to 60% in 2016 from 25% of 2003. (SSM PR 2016, p.4)  
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In 2011 Turkey thought Arab uprisings to be in its favor since it was signaling 
democratization in the beginning, but eventually, it added to the external threats 
Turkey faces. Because as the process continued, it created in the Middle East regimes 
that Turkey did not anticipate and breed a quasi-state formation that terrorizes a 
wider geography than its present location but specifically the countries in the region 
including Turkey. Firstly, the wave of democratization was supported but when 
radical movements came to the forefront exploiting the power vacuum Turkey 
became concerned with security and stability. (Börzel, Dandashly, & Risse, 2015, 
p.137) Furthermore, having previously supported the revolutionary movements with 
enthusiasm did not help Turkey when most of the countries went on with the old 
regimes. At the beginning, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were supported, but 
the military regime that toppled Morsi did not receive the same support from Turkey. 
Similarly, in the Syrian case, Turkish foreign policy makers assumed that Assad would 
fall and Syria would go on with Muslim Brothers, so invested in the opposition. (Yakış, 
2014)  
 
The arms in the arsenal were used by the governments on their own subjects was 
another unexpected development that created worldwide repercussions. It is 
important in the sense that as state security forces versus civilian protestors turned 
the uprisings into civil war, it affected Turkey’s security badly since the ongoing civil 
war creates chaos in the border, causes death of Turkish soldiers, empowers the 
sectarianism which is the bleeding wound in the region and strengthens the ISIS 
which poses a threat both for the region and for Turkey. As a result, Turkey became 
the unlucky neighbor of a country which is most affected by the uprisings and 
affected in a negative way.  
 
When the civil war broke out in Syria, Turkey suggested to the international 
community the importance of designating a buffer zone. The situation was not taken 
seriously but what happened at the end when the war got out of control was many 
displaced Syrians who had to leave their homes to survive. Moreover, it again struck 
Turkey the worst economically since it provides from its own resources for millions 
of Syrian people who arrived in Turkey. Also, it threatens Turkey's security since as 
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Barkey suggested refugee identity might be used as a mask by ISIS fighters to cross 
into Turkey. (Barkey, 2014, p.121) 
 
3.3. Deteriorating Relations with Israel 
Historically speaking Turkey was the first Muslim country that recognized Israel in 
1949 a year after it declared its independence. Two countries forged good relations 
in the beginning and Israeli PM even made a secret visit to Turkey in 1958 when two 
sides reached military and diplomatic agreements. (Özcan, 2008, p.110) Though, 
Turkish-Israeli relations had its ups and downs throughout years. Overall, in the years 
of the Cold War, the threat perception of two countries differed which prevented 
them from being involved in a conflict. Israel was worried about Arabs whereas 
Turkey was feeling threatened by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Israel always 
received American help and support, and Turkey too was the beneficiary of American 
aid in those years. Moreover, in a geography full of dictatorial regimes Israel and 
Turkey were the only democratic countries. Therefore, they cooperated as the 
members of the same camp.  
 
We saw rapprochement between two countries during the 90's. Military training, 
joint military operations, arms sales between the two were ordinary scenes in those 
years. With the increasing attacks of the PKK in 1990's, Turkey was in need of security 
which could be provided by Israel only, due to the fact that European countries did 
not sell arms to Turkey saying there were violations of human rights. However, Israel 
preferred not to comment on it and focused on its own share in the deal. With the 
intifadas in 2000's the tensions were high, and the distance between two countries 
increased. But the ongoing years witnessed ameliorating relations, with Turkey being 
a trusted partner of both sides in Israeli- Palestinian conflict. So the economic and 
military alliances improved. In 2000, Israel was given the project to modernize 
American made M-60 tanks which cost 687,5 million dollars. (Milliyet, 2010) In 2010, 
during the delivery of the last modernized tank, former Minister of Defense Vecdi 
Gonul gave information that from the Turkish side Aselsan, MKE, 1st and 2nd Base 
Maintenance Commands were also involved in the modernization process which 
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enabled technology transfer through cooperation with Israel that improves Turkey's 
defense industry capabilities. (Milliyet, 2010) 
 
Other than modernization projects, Turkey had been Israel’s primary customer in 
purchase of Herons, unmanned aerial vehicle until recently. It is a critical device in 
terms of collecting intelligence for the national security but for long Turkey had 
looked up to outside sources and depended on its purchases from Israel in particular. 
However, the relations between Israel and Turkey got worse due to several incidents 
which pushed Turkey to seek alternatives. The increased criticisms of then Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan of Israeli attacks in Gaza, The Davos crisis in January 2009, 
and Mavi Marmara incident when Israeli soldiers killed 9 Turkish human rights 
activists which was the last straw of the sequence of events broke down the relations 
between the two. Earlier in 2005, when the Herons produced for Turkey could not 
pass the tests Turkey had to rent another set of Herons from Israel which were to be 
used by Israeli pilots alone.  (Uslu, 2008; “Milli İHA’ya giden yol,” 2016) In 2009, 
Aerostar tactical UAVs that were being used until the delivery of Herons had to be 
returned because their high noise character was tipping off the targets and it was 
irritating and inconvenient for Turkey’s purposes. (“Israeli Manufacturers Turkish 
UAV Contract,” 2011) When the Mavi Marmara crisis erupted Israeli pilots, the only 
capable personnel to command the UAVs, left Turkey and the Herons could not be 
used by TAF. (“Israeli Manufacturers Turkish UAV Contract,” 2011; “Milli İHA’ya giden 
yol,” 2016) Moreover, 3 military exercises which were to be conducted with Israel 
were cancelled after the crisis. All of the military agreements were suspended 
including closing Turkish airspace to the Israeli military. (MFA, n.d.) In the upcoming 
years the relations got back on the rails and Israel delivered Herons to Turkey. But 
there occurred some other problems with them such as incapacity of reaching high 
lengths, remaining in the air for an unsatisfying time span and even the absence of 
chips that are required to detect terrorists. (“Milli İHA’ya giden yol,” 2016) The 
absence of some critical sub-systems were also approved at the time by Israeli 
defense officials as they said Israel would not permit its companies to give export 
license to Turkey for intelligence systems. Even though Israel was trying to improve 
relations with Ankara after the incident, Israeli authorities stated that: 
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the ministry was “responsible for every product that receives an export license” 
and that it could not currently permit the delivery of the intelligence-gathering 
systems to Turkey... [and such] decisions are made on a professional basis and 
in line with security and diplomatic considerations. (Katz, 2011) 
 
So Heron issue turned into a total crisis as they could not be used effectively by 
Turkey. And the risks of over-dependency for national security came to the surface 
once again. 
 
3.4. Stuck Within ISIS-PKK-PYD Triangle 
One end of the chaos in the border is related to the developments about the Kurds 
in Northern Syria which deteriorates the situation for Turkey. Kurds in Syria did not 
have a legal status but they started demanding recognition with the beginning of the 
civil war. (“Syria rejects Russian proposal for Kurdish federation,” 2016) Within the 
hectic environment of the war the PYD seized control over Northern Syria across 
Turkish border which is also close to Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq and 
declared cantons to which Turkey responded on the grounds that such an entity 
would whet the PKK’s appetite which Turkey has been trying to bring down for 
decades. Moreover, ISIS changed the balance of power in Syria by contributing to the 
advancement of the Assad’s forces and also that of the Kurdish movement in the 
region as they receive support and high-tech weaponry from the West since they 
fight against the ISIS on the ground. (Tziarras, 2015) 
 
As expected, the cross-border changes had repercussions on Turkey’s Kurdish issue. 
A peace process that had been going on between the Turkish government and the 
PKK was expected to put an end to the struggle within Turkey. Kurdish MPs were 
much more willing to get integrated into Turkish politics through their activities in 
the parliament. And the PKK had laid down arms which went on for several years. But 
when the parameters changed outside which shaped the regional politics in a friendly 
manner to the Kurds who are in favor of political independence, then they realized 
they had an edge over Turkey in the current scenario. It concerned Turkey even more 
about what would come up from the Kurdish side. In the new context they were likely 
to be a more significant actors of regional politics. Especially when the siege of Kobani 
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resulted in favor of Kurds at the expense of ISIS, it strengthened Kurds’ control and 
power along the Turkish-Syrian border as well as boosting their confidence. (Tziarras, 
2015) On July 2015, peace was brought to an end, and the arms struggle started 
again.12 So, the repercussions of the Syrian civil war on Turkey’s long-lasting Kurdish 
issue has been undesirable. It plays a part in the termination of the peace process 
with Kurdish movement and instigated the start of military struggle all over again 
which marks a major break point for Turkey. 
 
Another end of the chaos stemming from Syrian civil war is the formation of the ISIS 
which threatens Turkey's security from both across the border and inside Turkey. ISIS 
is capable of spreading its ideas internationally through using the benefits of the 
technology. By doing so, it did not recruit people only from Iraq where it originally 
emerged but foreign fighters from Turkey and European countries joined it as well. 
As Gambhir mentions (2016, p.31) ¨ISIS infiltrates cities with terrorist attacks and 
recruitment networks in Iraq, Syria and regionally, setting conditions for future 
campaigns¨. Hence, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that the attacks 
carried out by ISIS in Turkey are facilitated by the existence of recruits from Turkey 
inside the organization. Hence, ISIS does not stay as a security threat targeting the 
Southern borders of Turkey but it manages to become an internal security problem 
terrorizing cities and civilians in Turkey and creating a de facto security threat for 
Turkey than for most of the other countries in the anti-ISIS coalition. 
 
The emergence of ISIS, the rise of the PYD along with the PKK is not a subjective threat 
perception of Turkey. PYD receives support from the West and specifically from the 
US because it sees the PYD as a viable partner against ISIS that can fight on the 
ground. (Zanotti & Clayton, 2017, p.2; Lemmon, 2017) Hence, Turkey's opposition to 
the PYD does not stem from its counterbalance against ISIS but from its connection 
with the PKK. The PYD controls the Northern part of Syria which is close to where the 
                                                                                                                                                      
12 The PKK and Turkish authorities blame one another for the end of the peace process but neither 
side of the argument is adopted here. Rather, what is important for this thesis is the fact that the arms 
struggle between the PKK and Turkey started again adding to security threats perceived by Turkey, 
making it another domestic/regional problem Turkey deals with its defensive power. 
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PKK is located inside Turkey. And the US arms the PYD with the weapons that do not 
even exist in the inventory of TAF. After providing the PYD with 200 IAG Guardian 
Armored Personnel Carrier, lately, on February 2017 YPG was seen with Javelin which 
is a shoulder-fired anti-armor system that rises 150 meters higher and then hits the 
target where it is most vulnerable. ("ABD'den YPG'ye FGM-148 Javelin anti tank 
füzesi," 2017) It is a high-tech arms that are also known as an anti-tank weapon 
system which can fire 3 times in less than 90 seconds and its level of precision is more 
than 90% in the first strike. ("For Immediate Release," 2007) It is alarming for Turkey 
because the same weapons were found on 2 PKK terrorists captured dead in 2012 in 
Şırnak and the US authorities said that it might be fallen from a US helicopter that 
was doing a check flight and found by the PKK. ("ABD'den YPG'ye FGM-148 Javelin 
anti tank füzesi," 2017) 
 
The termination of the peace process cost Turkey very high. Restarting in the 
midsummer of 2015, arms struggle between Turkish security forces and the PKK 
intensified during the winter. Since July 2015 to March 2017, 897 state security forces 
were killed during the clashes. Moreover, the fight is not restricted to the rural areas. 
48% of people were killed in urban areas while 52% in rural areas. This puts the lives 
of ordinary citizens in danger as well. Civilian casualties during the period of 2015 to 
March 2017 was 392.13 ("Turkey's PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll," 2017) As well as 
showing the severity of the situation, it also alarmed Turkey to take security 
measures. 
 
It can be observed from the surrounding political environment that it made inevitable 
for Turkey to respond back to the threats with its military. Because as a result of the 
external changes Turkey is neighboring many states which have internal fights and 
shelter terrorist groups which on the other hand exacerbates Turkey's PKK problem. 
And Turkey is vulnerable to the shifts outside of its borders which do not stay at bay 
but find a way inwards Turkey. As Volten (2016, p.92) suggested: ¨Military power is a 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 If the youth of unknown affiliation is included the number reaches up to 660 
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crucial tool in directly providing territorial integrity and security for Turkey's 
population.¨ 
 
All of these facts explain the increase in defense spending but what stands out in this 
increasing trend is that Turkey is canalizing that spending into the development of a 
self-reliant defense industry. But why does not Turkey rely on NATO and on the US 
and the arms of defense that it can procure from the professional producers, but opts 
for developing its national defense industry? Apart from the obvious answer that it is 
the necessity of being an independent nation state, it is incumbent for Turkey 
because of the colliding interests of it with Europe and the US. The historic 
differences of interests were discussed previously in the paper which showed the 
colliding interests between Turkey and its allies, and the recent events do not prove 
otherwise. While the US was supporting the anti-Assad forces at the start (namely 
Free Syrian Army-FSA) just like Turkey, then it shifted its support to YPG which Turkey 
closely associated with what it called a separatist terrorist organization, PKK.  
 
Unlike Turkey which see the PKK’s agenda as terrorism, some European countries like 
Greece had provided financial and logistical support to the PKK back in 1990’s. 
(Aycan, 2015, p.3; Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi, 2000, p.146) Plus as Martin underlines 
(2000, p.87) Iraq and Syria too supported the organization for political purposes 
which worsened the situation from the perspective of Turkey, even more, when the 
PKK started taking advantage of the power vacuum in the Middle East. The internal 
and external threats were connected for Turkey. When the threat to its borders from 
outside actors intensified so did the threats from inside found an environment to 
flourish. On the other hand, the intensified warfare in the region causes displacement 
of civilians which puts a burden on Turkey as there is no limit to the refugees Turkey 
accepts contrary to other European states which allow only a limited number of them 
into their countries. What makes it even more contradictory and problematic for 
Turkey is that the refugee card can be used as a way into Turkish territory by the ISIS 
fighters (Barkey, 2014, p.121) who terrorized Turkey on several occasions. 
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3.4.1. NATO Patriots 
Developing its own defense strategy and materiel is important for Turkey because its 
Western allies and NATO may fall short of protecting Turkey. Placement of NATO 
Patriot Missiles in Turkey’s South Eastern region can be an example of that. They 
were stationed as a protection against the attacks coming from Syria on February 
2013 upon Turkey’s request after the killing of Turkish citizens in a Syrian attack that 
took place in October 2012. (Goksedef, 2015) Holland withdrew its missiles in January 
2015, and Germany and the US stated they would withdraw their batteries in spite 
of Russian violations of Turkish air space which made Turkey question the dedication 
of NATO to defend its member in case of an attack from outside. (Emmott, Siebold, 
& Stewart, 2015) When the incursions happened, only Spanish batteries were in place 
but they did not want to act alone against Russia. 
 
After Patriots were withdrawn, Turkey and the US reached an agreement concerning 
the fight against ISIS. A point of contention arose with regards to against whom the 
jets flying from Incirlik are going to target. Turkish and the US authorities differed in 
that respect. Councilor of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu mentioned 
the regime, PYD, and ISIS as targets whereas former Spokesman of Department of 
State John Kirby said that the campaign was against ISIS alone. (Goksedef, 2015) 
Although Turkey is coordinating with coalition powers in the fight against ISIS, it 
cannot talk its allies into a fight against PKK, PYD and Assad regime. This and 
withdrawal of Patriots prompted Turkey to develop its own national missile defense 
system said former Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz. (Goksedef, 2015) 
 
Various defense systems are being developed since 2005 by Roketsan and Aselsan 
which are actively used in operations by TAF in current conflicts in the region. New 
systems and capabilities brought about by its new equipment enable Turkey to 
actively involve in regional issues when its security is at stake. In 2003 Turkey could 
not pass the proposal from its Parliament to let US troops using Turkish bases. After 
a little longer than a decade, when Turkey became much more confident due to its 
self-reliance in the defense industry, Turkey entered into Syrian territory in 2015 in 
order to secure Tomb of Suleyman Shah which was besieged and was also threatened 
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to be destroyed by ISIS. (BBC, “Why is Suleyman Shah’s tomb so important?,” 2015) 
As the site was accepted as Turkish territory, protecting it from any outside attack 
was seen to be the duty by Turkey since Syrian government had no control over its 
Northern Territory. It resulted in Turkish troops entering into Syria, destroying the 
historic tomb and moving it to a secured place. 
 
3.4.2. Operations against ISIS 
After the small operation of Suleiman Shah, Turkey got into the Syrian borders with 
much more bigger military action known as Euphrates Shield in August 2016. Turkey’s 
intention with the operation was to secure Azez-Jerablus line, and Special Forces of 
TAF and Turkish Air Forces supported FSA in land and aerial operations with troops, 
tanks, and warplanes. 100 km-long line of Turkish-Syrian border is secured and 2,000 
square km area inside Syria is controlled banishing ISIS from the territory neighboring 
Turkey, establishing a safe zone securing its borders. (Osborne, 2017; Kasapoglu, 
2017) It also prevented PYD cantons from coming together about which Turkey is 
very prudent for its possible effect on strengthening of the PKK. (Sönmez, 2017) With 
this operation, Turkey and opposition forces took control of Al-Bab, Jarablus, and 
Dabiq from ISIS in February 2017.14 While doing the operation Turkey was not backed 
up by another country. Regarding the issue, U.S. Colonel John Dorrian said on 
November 17 that Turkey’s operations on Al-Bab were undertaken independently 
and the anti-ISIL coalition did not support it. (Demirtaş, 2016)  
 
The situation in Iraq presents another regional security concern for Turkey. After ISIS 
took control of Mosul in 2014, one of Iraq’s major cities, and started operating from 
there, it has shaken down the already divided Iraq against which the central 
government could do nothing. On 11 June 2014 Turkish Embassy was invaded by ISIS 
militants and the personnel was taken hostages for 101 days. When an operation was 
discussed to take Mosul back Turkey too insisted on being both on the table and on 
the ground even though Iraqi government did not want Turkey to be involved. ("The 
Battle for Mosul in maps," 2017) The insistence of Turkey to be present in steps taken 
                                                                                                                                                      
14 Al-Bab is the most strategic city after Raqqa; 30 km away from Turkey’s border, also on a key route 
towards Iraq, Raqqa, Aleppo and Deir-al-Zour. 
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in Mosul is a result of its confidence in its ability to defend itself and determination 
to be a country which has a say in the reshaping of the geography that affects its 
present and future. The conjunctural changes and its murky relations with long term 
allies pushed Turkey to become self-sufficient and independent in foreign policy 
which results in assertive moves taken by Turkey. 
 
All in all, Turkey was deeply affected by the conjunctural changes of its region. The 
threat that started with the invasion of Iraq, grew serious with the PKK taking up 
arms. The democratic peace process to settle the Kurdish question put a hold on the 
use of arms which was reversed with the Arab uprisings and the void created in Syria 
by the civil war. It, directly and indirectly, affected Turkey’s national security. It had 
direct consequences since there were bombs hitting Turkish cities along the border 
and endangering the lives of Turkish citizens. It indirectly left Turkey vulnerable firstly 
by opening up a space for the PKK connected PYD in the Northern part of Syria which 
encouraged the PKK to take advantage of the chaos. Secondly, by facilitating the 
formation of the Islamic State that carried out attacks in Turkey and recruiting people 
to fight.  
 
While all of the anti-ISIS coalition countries are worried about ISIS alone, Turkey feels 
also insecure by the parameters formed by PYD and PKK. Moreover, the successive 
crisis of Davos, Mavi Marmara and Heron with Israel costed Turkey a strategic partner 
for its military modernization and for its arms of defense purchases. Turkey not only 
diverges with its long term strategic partner, the US, in terms of whom to side with 
in Syrian civil war but also with its Northern neighbor Russia and Iran who support 
Assad regime. Israel no longer provides arms to Turkey unconditionally unlike 1990’s. 
Even when it does so, there are problems with the procured arms which cannot be 
tackled by Turkey alone.  
 
To conclude, this chapter discussed the conflicting interests of Turkey with its 
partners, the heated up and unsafe environment both inside and outside Turkey 
which pushed it to invest in the national defense industry. I first presented a historical 
outlook at Turkey's security perspective, then explained regional changes that mount 
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up the arms race. I reviewed Turkey's relations with the countries in the Middle East 
and also in the West. Overall, I showed that the regional conjuncture and lack of trust 
in allies are important components of the action-reaction model which convinced 
Turkey to develop a national defense industry. In the next chapter, I will deal with the 
domestic structure which is another motivation for a country to sustain its industrial 
self-reliance.
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CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC STRUCTURE MODEL 
 
There are several ways through which domestic structure figures in the development 
of a national defense industry due to the fact that it can be used as a means of 
domestic politics by politicians. On the one hand, politicians promise new 
investments and jobs through pledging investment in defense which increases their 
appeal to the electorate. On the other hand, politicians know that acquiring their own 
arms of defense enables them to use it as a tool of foreign policy against other 
countries either to deter aggressors or to attack in the name of country’s sovereignty. 
It means boosting of a national glory for the country and for its people which can be 
used by policymakers to justify their investments in country’s defense. Both country’s 
glory and prestige outside, and employment opportunities that are attained as a 
result of national defense build-up play a role in electoral politics.  
 
Another way through which domestic structure affects national defense is explained 
by Military Keynesian approach. According to this approach the state increases 
military spending as it stimulates the economy. Apart from the promises made by 
political parties, the defense industry is inevitably the pioneer of creating jobs, 
especially for the qualified workforce. In addition to Military Keynesianism, the 
military-industrial complex is another important variable that encourages 
investments in country’s defense. Industry owners in that respect are motivated by 
their personal material gains rather than sustaining the security of the country. So it 
has to do more with the economy than politics and security. 
 
As can be seen, a country’s internal motivation to invest in defense has got 
implication at domestic level which is two-fold. It has socio-political consequences 
that indirectly affect the society and economic implications that have direct 
consequences. Socio-political consequences will be mentioned in this chapter 
whereas military-industrial complex along with Military Keynesian approach with 
both the reasons that motivate the politicians and reflections of it on country’s 
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economy are going to be mentioned in the next chapter where Political Economy of 
the Defense Industry will be dealt with in detail. 
 
4.1. Meaning of the Defense Industry for Politics 
The real strength of a country’s military is not measured by the buying capacity of a 
state or the share of the military expenditure in GDP. A state can procure defense 
equipment from heavy arms and land vehicles to electronic systems and missiles. But 
this does not free a state from the rules and regulations that apply to it and limit 
areas of usage of those materials. Moreover, even though that state does not see any 
harm in procuring arms from foreign firms, modernization and maintenance issues 
force the buyer state to cooperate with the producer. (Beckley, 2010, p.55) This 
dependence makes any state seem weak and vulnerable before other states and in 
the eyes of its own public. Such an image is unacceptable for politicians which might 
cost them their office for the incapacity of sustaining security and even honor of the 
country. Hence, industrial self-reliance in defense is a significant issue that politicians 
care about if not in reality at least in a discursive level that would be enough to 
convince the public to carry them to the office. 
 
In the case of Turkey as well the concern for the issue depends on both security and 
prestige. Historically speaking the idea of military, war, defense/offense, and the 
army is highly revered among Turkish public. In history classes, it is being taught that 
ancestors of Turkey were warriors and conquerors who fight not just to protect 
themselves but also rush to help those in need. Army-nation is a phrase that is used 
to describe Turks which means that every single member of the nation is considered 
to be a potential soldier in case of mobilization of which people are proud. Military 
service and soldiery were and still are held in high regard. Even today, the fact that 
Turkey has the second largest army of NATO is considered to point to how big and 
strong of a country Turkey is by the people. Even when it is just in terms of the 
amount of military personnel, people take pride in that. So empowering the country 
with a growing defense industry that can manufacture its own arms and meet the 
growing needs of defense internally would definitely be something to cater to the 
nationalistic emotions of the electorate. The motivation provided by regional threats 
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to develop a national defense industry was mentioned in the previous chapter and 
now I will be dealing with its electoral aspects.  
 
Since the first decade of 2000’s, what Turkey aims to do with its initiatives and 
enterprises in the defense sector is sustaining self-sufficiency and being able to 
produce the critical technologies in the defense industry on its own. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter there is a real threat stemming from the upheavals and terror 
in the geography. As the geographical security threats force Turkey to prioritize its 
defense in general and development of a national defense industry in particular, it 
also became high on the agenda of the politicians. This resulted in the increase in 
self-reliance in defense which is a useful election tool that boosts the country’s 
prestige in the international arena and chalks up points to the politicians. What 
makes investments and developments in the field of defense a critical policy tool and 
more important than any other public investment is its multifaceted reflections that 
affect fields other than defense. First of all, it promises to increase employment 
which provides jobs for educated and qualified people. Secondly, it decreases 
country’s dependence on outside sources which makes economically a positive effect 
on the budget. Moreover, as it decreases dependence of the nation for its protection 
it is a sign of independence and sovereignty. Last but not least, it gains the country 
prestige in the international platforms by making it a deterrent power, puts it on 
equal footing with other renowned countries. All of these benefits that are provided 
by a nationally self-sufficient defense industry motivate politicians to do such 
investments which are going to add distinction to them by being used as a tool in a 
loaded election campaign. However, pursuing such policies and arriving at successful 
results also take a determined political will which can be set out by a strong 
government policies of which are not disrupted by election results. So as to show the 
importance of continuing state policies, I will be reviewing electoral politics pursued 
by political parties.  
 
4.2. Electoral Politics 
Even though domestic structure model is complementary to action-reaction model, 
the model which argues that military build-up of nation-states motivate other 
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countries to increase spending on defense which as a result lead to an international 
arms race, it is of great importance to point out how political parties evaluate the 
situation they are in and how they reflect it during their time in office and during 
elections. Here, I will be looking at how major political parties in Turkey assess the 
defense industry and what solutions they come up with in regard to national security 
and defense as part of their party programs. I will be analyzing election declarations 
of AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP and how much coverage they gave to the topic. Since the 
invasion of Iraq precipitated the series of events that changed the dynamics in the 
region and helped Turkey shape the policy of nationalization, 2003 is going to be the 
starting point of my discussion. I will evaluate the motivations of parties before and 
after Iraq’s invasion through their election declarations to see how it changed along 
with the changes in the region. 
 
The statements and promises made in these documents can be realistic or unrealistic 
but this is not part of the discussion here. Whether they are genuine or not they were 
used prior to elections by political parties as tools to gain the trust of the electorate.  
Hence, they deserve a thorough analysis. Promises about national defense and 
nationalization of defense make people feel more secure and think of their country 
more proudly as it is much less dependent on the outside sources for its own 
protection. It is an assurance of sovereignty which makes the politicians and their 
party more credible in the eyes of the people, and credibility is what counts for the 
electorate and what affects whom they are going to vote for in the next elections. 
 
4.2.1. Ruling Party: AKP 
While the issue of defense was not specifically referred to in the election declaration 
of the AKP in 2002, it was mentioned in part by saying that the extended volume of 
trade would enhance regional security. (AKP, 2002, p.59) It was also stated in the 
declaration that rescuing Turkey from the sectoral dependence in export by 
diversifying its industrial base was important. Although it did not specifically mention 
the defense industry, ¨diversifying industrial base¨ might be taken to be alluding to 
Turkey’s security and the necessity of defense policies. However, it also shows that 
industrialization in defense was not part of the discussion prior to 2002 election. Due 
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to the urgency of issues related to social welfare and economy, defense policies were 
unambiguously not high on the agenda.  
 
Approaching the election 2007, what agitated the society and had reflections on the 
politicians in Turkey also influenced the policies to be followed by the government. 
The fact that Iraq was invaded by the US in 2003 and the new federal system gave 
Kurds in Northern Iraq an autonomous government was a brand new problem which 
was not alarming for Turkey in the days of Saddam Hussein. (Mercan, 2016, p.107) 
Now that the system has changed, Kurds became the advantageous party in the 
country, self-governing policies of which could stir up the PKK’s aspiration for 
independence. On the other hand, there was not a strong central government in Iraq 
that could allow operations of Turkey, unlike Saddam Hussein. And having an alliance 
with the Americans to whom Kurds in Northern Iraq owe their independence, they 
were closer to the Americans than to Turks. Having alleviated the most pressing 
socio-economic problems of Turkey, brought to the surface these problems which 
gave to politicians and to public new concerns to deal with. In 2007 the government 
was more assertive in its claims about country’s defense. 
 
In order to make Turkey a global actor with determining power, the AKP saw it 
imperative to combine country’s deterrent power with its soft power. (AKP, 2007, 
p.232) Security in the region was maintained by being able to communicate and solve 
the conflicts between different actors in case of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iran which 
was facilitated by shuttle diplomacy and mutual trust. (AKP, 2007, p.235) So, the AKP 
utilized its soft power both in diplomatic and in electoral senses and it could utilize 
its defensive power in security and electoral senses. Prior to 2007 elections 
government took new measures to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces for the first 
time. The projects of national corvette ship, tank, UAV, and attack helicopter projects 
were given a start which all catered to protect security through surveillance, 
defensive and offensive policies. Whereas the ability of domestic sectors to meet the 
demand of TAF was 25% in 2002, the 2007 election declaration draw attention to 
how it increased to 36% in 2006. (AKP, 2007, p.250) 
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In 2011 elections parties attributed, even more importance to the issue of national 
defense which is reflected openly in their declarations. The AKP declared that the 
R&D employment in fields such as defense, health, and energy would be promoted. 
(AKP, 2011, p.75) Whereas defense requirements of the country were met from 
foreign resources until recently, the AKP takes pride in domestic industry’s capacity 
to meet half of the TAF’s needs. (AKP, 2011, p.76) The AKP says that the experience 
it has accumulated in the field of defense will be used in its next term in government 
to provide added-value and increase the quality of the workforce. (AKP, 2011, p.76) 
Moreover, this added-value and workforce are said to be transferred into high-tech 
sectors such as transportation, health, and energy; as well as into low-tech sectors 
such as agriculture, textile, and tourism which will ensure they continue their 
competitive edge in the world. (AKP, 2011, pp.76-77) By saying that arms of defense 
produced locally does not only meet the domestic requirements but also are being 
exported which generates a serious economic value, the AKP shows the electorate 
that its activities in the field of defense benefits country’s own security as well as its 
economy. Three and a half pages long section of the ¨defense industry¨ details what 
the AKP has done so far, what it gains the country economically and security-wise, 
and what will be accomplished in the forthcoming terms. (AKP, 2011, pp.84-87) 
 
The vision provided by the ongoing defense projects since the beginning of 2000’s 
impelled political parties in 2015 elections to attribute greater importance to the 
subject. Having been the ruling party and having payed particular attention to the 
defense industry, the AKP concentrated on it in 2015’s declaration. (Mevlütoğlu, 
2015) In the document, the rise of the defense industry exports was highlighted and 
it is emphasized how Turkey became a part of the international market in the sector. 
(AKP, 2015, p.201) The projects that are concluded and ongoing were listed in the 
document with a specific emphasis on ¨national¨ such as national tank, national anti-
tank, national missile, and national torpedo. Besides, the names given to such 
projects have national references several of which are Milgem, Hürkuş, Altay, 
Göktürk, and Türksat. The language that is being used is significant as it influences 
the way people looks at and evaluates the projects. In the declaration it was also 
stated that with the communication satellite project the aim is to make Turkey one 
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of the 10 countries that can produce its own satellite. (AKP, 2015, p.275) The part 
about defense is concluded by saying that all of these projects would ensure Turkey’s 
security and increase Turkey’s deterrent force. (AKP, 2015, p.276) 
 
4.2.1.1. 2023 Vision 
2023 Vision of the ruling the AKP government deserves attention because it is being 
used in every election campaign very effectively. In 2012 government put forth and 
released the 2023 vision it anticipated for Turkey, in which it was stated that so as to 
become a leading country in the region and in the world, Turkey’s military and 
defense must be deterrent and modern. (2023 Vision, 2012, p.70) It became more 
important than a regular election manifesto which completes its life after being used 
excessively for a couple of months prior to elections. The part about defense in the 
document goes with the following: 
 
The defense industry has improved during our government. From a country 
that could not produce even its infantry rifle, Turkey became a country that will 
start producing its own national tank. We have prepared all of the 
infrastructures to manufacture a modern national tank which we called Altay. 
We have started the test flights of Anka unmanned aerial vehicle that flies at 
10 thousand meters altitude and stay in the air for 24 hours. During our 
government, in the procurement of weapons, equipment and ammunition the 
share of national production and technology increased almost to 50%. Now, we 
export weapons. As a part of 2023 vision, we aim to have a Turkey designing 
and producing all of its military defense needs.15 (2023 Vision, 2012, p.70) 
 
This document gained more significance than periodic election campaigns with the 
future it envisions for Turkey. The commitments it makes extent its appeal. It 
underlines the improvements in the defense industry, emphasizes the economics 
gains and independence brought about by industrial self-reliance. Since 2012, the 
points declared in the Vision is being intensely used especially by President Erdogan 
and Prime Ministers throughout years during their speeches, public gatherings, and 
meetings rallying people around an aim which means national glory and honor as it 
envisions and promises a strong Turkey with its economy and security. Overall, the 
document plays a significant role for the government in its electoral politics. 
                                                                                                                                                      
15 translation from Turkish is author’s 
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4.2.2. Opposition Parties 
4.2.2.1. CHP 
The largest opposition party the CHP, gave more coverage to the issue of defense in 
2002 which is the first election the AKP took part in. The party stated that full support 
will be given to high-tech sectors such as information technology, biotechnology, and 
the defense industry to make them the driving force of the economy. (CHP, 2002, 
p.34) In order to promote the export of products of such sectors, the CHP declared 
that it will provide an environment for the establishment of silicon valleys in Anatolia 
where infrastructure and human resources are available which was an answer to the 
chronic problem of unemployment pointed out in the manifesto. (CHP, 2002, pp.24-
34) Moreover, national defense needs were aimed at being met more by the means 
of national industry which is showing the electorate that the party is working for 
national glory and independence. 
 
In 2007, by stressing how badly the country was managed for the last five years the 
CHP draws the attention to poverty, unemployment and country’s internal/external 
debts. (CHP, 2007, pp:24-30) Moreover, the CHP remarked that the national unity 
was under threat and one of its primary reasons terror would be actively fought 
against once the CHP came to power. (CHP, 2007, pp:1-2-8) The proposed solution 
was an outward national industrialization which will decrease unemployment. (CHP, 
2007, p.30) 
 
In face of increasing threats coming across the South Eastern borders, in 2015 the 
CHP introduced its standpoint about defense by stating that the border security 
would be re-established and that the hardware and capabilities of security forces 
would be ameliorated. (CHP, 2015, p.164) In order to combat terrorism, the CHP 
suggested to make more bilateral agreements with countries in the region. (CHP, 
2015, p.205) However, there were no specific project proposals in its declaration. In 
terms of country’s defense, cooperation with international institutions like UN and 
NATO was brought to the forefront. (CHP, 2015, p.203) 
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4.2.2.2. MHP 
In its 2002 declaration, MHP mentions the defense industry by saying that 
investments will be encouraged and supported in technology intensive sectors. 
(MHP, 2002, pp.50-51) Acquisition policy in national defense will depend on R&D 
which will be used to enhance country’s competence in technology and innovation. 
(MHP, 2002, p.107) MHP lastly mentions the importance of defense maintenance 
which it finds vital in terms of the security of the country and counterterrorism. 
(MHP, 2002, p.122) 
 
Similar to the aim of the AKP, in 2007 MHP underlined that TAF should be raised to 
the level of the most advanced armies in the world. (MHP, 2007, p.24) In the 
declaration it was stated that Turkey’s location, historical and cultural heritage makes 
it responsible to contribute to peace through a strong defense system. Additionally, 
MHP pointed out that since it was also about decreasing dependence on outside, 
indigenous defense industry will be encouraged. (MHP, 2007, p.25) Emphasizing 
country’s sovereignty and national independence through an indigenous defense 
industry is particularly important for MHP as it puts a premium on nationality in its 
discourse. Furthermore, defense project investments are told to be prioritized under 
the heading of ¨public investment policies¨ because it is seen as a lever for the 
economy which will range up society’s welfare. (MHP, 2007, p.79) 
 
Different than its previous election messages, in 2011 MHP stated that in the field of 
defense and security a national satellite would be produced; national software 
systems would be developed and implemented and Turkey’s defense industry would 
be producing technology instead of transferring it. (MHP, 2011, pp.96-181) With its 
own capacity to develop technology, Turkey would then export what it has produced. 
(MHP, 2011, pp.96-182) 
 
On top of what it has suggested in previous declarations, in 2015 the MHP claimed to 
start new modernization programs in order to increase the deterrence of the TAF and 
make it one of the strongest armies in the world. (MHP, 2015, p.245) It also promised 
to increase the employment of professional personnel in TAF who are specialized in 
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the use of high-tech. The MHP stated that it would establish an independent, 
indigenous war industry and give economic incentive to domestic investors who want 
to produce military supplies and weapons. (MHP, 2015, p.246) In order to support 
the development of the domestic defense industry the declaration underlined that 
the needs of defense would be met primarily from national procurement system. 
(MHP, 2015, p.247) The MHP gave the signals of establishing an aerospace institution 
and ¨Cyber War and Electronic Security Command¨ that would work to prevent 
asymmetrical threats to country’s security. (MHP, 2015, p.247) 
 
4.2.2.3. HDP 
The HDP on the other hand, in its various party forms did not give the same attention 
to the issue of national security unlike ruling party and other opposition parties. In 
2011, the BDP declared to end compulsory military service and accord a right to 
conscientious objection. (Gedik, 2012) In 2015, it did mention the issue of security 
only marginally by declaring that defense/security expenditures would be reduced 
and become open to public inspection, and that discretionary fund would be 
abolished. (HDP, 2015, p.30) 
 
In this section, I analyzed the evaluation of national security and defense industry by 
the main political parties in Turkey. Election declarations of all the parties showed 
that the AKP as the ruling party that holds the aces for 15 years is ideologically 
invested more in the issue of security and defense. Moreover, it has a chance to prove 
its dedication through realizing projects as the governing party which is not an option 
for the rest. On the other hand, the MHP is more concerned with the ideological value 
of nationalization whereas the CHP is focusing on how badly influenced the security 
of the country by the policies pursued by the government and regional political 
changes. As opposed to all the other parties, the HDP appears to be against any kind 
of militarization with its agenda of revoking compulsory military service. 
In the next section, I will discuss in which ways the domestic structure is influenced 
by the defense spending. Since it is not only the military power of the country that is 
influenced by the defense investments, it is important to pay attention to its various 
positive and negative externalities which influence the public perception of the 
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government's performance. As Ram (Ram, 1993, p.28) and Viotti (Viotti, 1994, p.4) 
suggested commercial spin-offs benefit other sectors, and improve the conditions for 
their workers as well. Although the results of these improvements are known as 
positive externalities which can be used as a policy tool by politicians in their 
campaigns and speeches, negative ones can be kept in dark which makes examining 
them particularly important.  
 
4.3. Externalities of National Defense Industry 
4.3.1. Positive Externalities 
The competence of Turkish defense industry in the international market is closely 
associated with its R&D investments which bring about its authenticity. From 2006 to 
2011 the ratio of meeting the needs of defense industry domestically increased from 
36.7% to 54% and to 60% in 2016. (SSM Performance Programme, 2013; TOBB Sector 
Report, 2012; SSM PP 2016, p.4) Other than its effects on country’s security as a direct 
consequence of the process, there are indirect consequences that generate greater 
results for the country. 
 
Apart from increasing the volume of the defense industry, it also increases the 
defense-related manufacturing industries. Moreover, the high-tech involved in the 
making of defense industry products will further enhance technological advancement 
and will boost product development. By doing so it firstly augments the use of 
existing capacity and then it improves the capacity by incorporating new techniques 
that industries come up with in the process. Furthermore, it will increase 
employment which in great proportion takes in the qualified workforce. In 2006 the 
workforce employed in the defense sector excluding TAF personnel was 30.808 all of 
which were skilled. (TOBB, 2007, p.7) In 2012 this number increased to 33.491. 
(Sasad, 2013, p.10) When it came to 2015, engineers comprised 34% of the total 
number in the sector which means that design and development are really intense 
and expertise is highly required. (Sasad PR, 2015, p.12) 
 
Another indirect contribution of it is seen in the use of the same technology in 
different fields. For example, Aselsan is a company established to meet the demands 
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of Turkish Armed Forces and it specifically works on technological products and 
invests in R&D. It now uses the knowledge and experience it has accumulated since 
decades while working for military innovations. In 2015, Aselsan set up another 
institute called UGES operating under its roof which utilizes Aselsan’s expertise and 
technology at its disposal in fields of transportation, security, energy, and 
automatization. In cooperation with TEMSA, it produces electric buses for instance. 
Aselsan Electric Vehicle System’s Manager Murat Topçu underlines the importance 
of such technology by referring to ripple effects of military technology: 
 
Control systems of the bus are the ones developed by us for military vehicles. 
We carried these units to civilian use... Electric motor, control unit, engine fead 
and other necessary inverters of the bus are produced nationally by Aselsan 
which can be used in various vehicles from naval platforms and rail systems to 
wheeled vehicles. (“Aselsan-Temsa elektrikli otobüs geliştirdi,” 2017) 
 
Furthermore, Aselsan uses the technology in its hands so as to decrease the external 
dependence in the healthcare field. It is developing an MR system in cooperation with 
Bilkent University which is expected to make imaging process five times faster, 
decreasing the time span a patient is spending in the scanner and increasing the 
number of patients a scanner can take in the same time interval. By doing these, 
Aselsan UGES intends to get intellectual property rights in medical imaging devices. 
(“Aselsan sağlık sektörüne öncülük edecek,” 2015) Such a ripple effect is caused by 
increased R&D spending which is prioritized by the company. Minister of National 
Defense Fikri Işık refers to the defense industry as the sector that has done the most 
investment in the R&D and technology. (Annual Activity Report, 2016, p.8) In 2015, 
Aselsan became the first in the list of ARGE 2015, a study that reveals the top R&D 
investors in Turkey. (“Beklenen araştırma tamamlandı,” 2016) According to the same 
research, in 2014 its investment was $807 million and rose to $912 million the next 
years. 
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Figure 4.1. R&D Spending in Defense Industry (million $)16 
 
Apart from in-country production, its expertise made Aselsan a member of the team 
that will enhance NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program which will be headed 
by Leidos-USA. Other than Turkey the countries involved in the project are Canada, 
France, Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States, all 
countries with high technological capabilities. (“Aselsan Joins BMD Team,” 2015) 
Such a collaboration in the field of a modern defense program will strengthen 
Turkey’s capabilities that will then contribute to developments in related 
technologies. All of these clearly indicate how military technologies can benefit other 
sectors of a country and upgrade its companies in the international arena. 
 
Other than the application of military technology to different fields, new military 
equipment can also be used for civilian purposes. The arms of defense are no more 
composed of weapons to kill or inflict damage unlike those of the 20th century. There 
are very complex, high-tech products like UAVs which can be armed and unarmed 
that are used to eliminate targets or to surveil and discover. One of Turkey’s three 
UAVs is Vestel’s Karayel which is being used to surveil pipelines, frontiers, and 
immigrant groups, and also as a fire extinguisher. (A. Erkan, personal communication, 
November 12, 2016)17 
 
All of these are results of the positive spillovers that are generated by the 
development of technologies through making investments in the national defense 
                                                                                                                                                      
16 Source: SASAD and SSM’s reports from 2003 to 2016. Data of some years is retrieved from SASAD 
and missing data is completed from SSM’s reports. 
17Vestel’s Marketing Manager Aytül Erkan remarked during our personal communication in exhibition 
of defense products. 
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industry. However, there are also downsides of funneling a large amount of money 
into defense sector which brings about its negative externalities. 
 
4.3.2. Negative Externalities 
Although Turkey is a developing country which does not suffer from scarcity of 
resources unlike LDCs, the criticisms about downsides to defense expenditure are still 
drawing attention to negative spillovers. The basic argument starts with the idea that 
there can be more investment in education, housing, transportation and all the other 
sectors that affect the wellbeing of the society more directly if there was not large 
amount of spending in country’s defense. That is why Arnold Wolfers (1952, p.487) 
remarks increased armaments even though it leads to more security may cause 
opposition for decreasing social benefits. Seeing the trade-off caused by security 
spending versus other social benefits clarifies what brings about the point of 
contention within the country. In case of Turkey however, there is no striking increase 
in military spending since 2003. (see figure 5.5 in page 79) Conversely, 2015’s military 
expenditure is lower than that of 2003. While military spending stays nearly the 
same, Turkey’s GDP is increasing. Since the share of the military expenditures within 
its GDP is declining, there is no apparent negative influence on Turkey’s budget for 
socially benefiting sectors. 
 
However, it can be argued that more money could be allocated for socially 
constructive projects by cutting down on the budget of military projects. Budgets of 
various ministries reveal the priority given to different sectors in 2016: 
 
Table 4.1. Budgets of Ministries in 2016 (TL) (Source: BİK, 2016) 
Ministries Budget of 2016 
National Defense  26.451.504.000 
National Education 76.354.306.000 
Health 4.133.959.000 
Labor and Social Security 38.373.835.000 
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The budget of the Ministry of National Defense is higher than the budget of the 
Ministry of Health and it seems to be smaller than those of Education, and Labor and 
Security. However, Turkey’s defense spending is not limited by the budget of the 
Ministry. Undersecretariat of Defense Industry is an autonomous institution 
functioning under the roof the Ministry but it has its own budget. Total cost of project 
agreements under UDI was 85.428.873.857 TL in 2015 which can be taken as an 
indicator that such huge amount of money is being spent on defense in general. (SSM, 
2015, p.48) If the chances were given to other sectors, they could have used it 
effectively which would enhance social welfare. Moreover, there is the discretionary 
fund at the disposal of the President which he can give to any institution he sees fit. 
Its very existence is being questioned as there is no transparency about where it is 
canalized. It might be contributing to non-defensive purposes but there is a reason 
for the discretionary fund to be kept as a secret whereas there is no need for socially 
constructive projects to be paid privately from the fund. Hence, it is generally 
assumed that the fund in great amount is comprised of highly confidential payments 
that concern security, defense, and interests of the country. 
 
Quality personnel lacked in other sectors is another critique to employment in the 
defense industry. In order to see the distribution of employment across sectors in 
Turkey looking at workers in each sector will be explanatory. There were 893.092 
teachers within the body of Ministry of National Education; 31.375 people working 
in defense industry and 359.289 soldiers in Turkey in 2015 (MEB, 2016, p11; SASAD, 
2015, p.12; Cumhuriyet, 2016) In the defense industry in 2015, 34% of the workers 
are engineers which correspond to 10.660 people. (SASAD, 2015, p.12) The hiring of 
engineers in the sector is said to increase employment on the one hand but on the 
other hand, it is only a limited number of the same workforce. Furthermore, the 
situation of these people in military-related sectors is criticized for preventing the 
highly qualified workforce from engaging in projects that benefit the society through 
contributing to projects that serve to people which can make their everyday lives 
easier. But whether or not 10.660 engineers in defense create a scarcity of workforce 
for civilian sectors is disputable. 
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Overall, this chapter made an analysis of the domestic structure in the formation of 
the national defense industry. In that vein, it discussed how politicians read the 
country’s necessities and represent it to the electorate in such a way to outpoint 
other political parties which will enable them to win the elections. It then elaborated 
on the positive externalities the industry brings with it. However, its effects are not 
limited to the benefits it provides so its possible negative externalities are also 
pointed out. Following the above-mentioned analysis, the next chapter is going to 
expatiate on the economy of the defense industry.
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CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
 
Defense expenditures of countries worldwide started to show a decreasing trend 
with the end of the Cold War. It did not take longer than a decade for the arms race 
to go on with the start of the global war on terror, invasion of Iraq and many other 
regional conflicts as discussed in chapter three. Increased military expenditures have 
for sure social, political, and humanitarian aspects but there also is economic 
implications of it. Military industry means huge economic revenues for countries that 
sell their arms abroad and it means enormous economic costs for those which 
procure from outside such arms due to the lack of industrial self-reliance. The five 
countries that have major shares in the international arms transfer namely the USA, 
Russia, China, France, Germany are responsible for 74% of the volume. (Fleurant & 
Perlo-Freeman, 2016, p.2) And since the arms of defense are state of the art 
technology products to which a lot of time, research and development, and human 
capacity are invested in, they are hard to create and hence expensive. Once they are 
obtained through export license, country of final destination is not free to use it in 
any way that it wants but it is bounded by international agreements. Therefore being 
the creator and sole owner of these high-tech arms is highly profitable for a country 
in the sense that it will boost technological advancement which will in return 
contribute to defense industry as well as other industries that benefit from 
technological advancements. Overall, these make a country competitive in the 
international market and it increases the volume of its economy. In this chapter firstly 
I will look at the military expenditures in the world and their implications on 
economies. Then I will analyze how Turkey moved from import dependent military 
industry to a much more self-reliant country in terms of defense, and look into the 
effects of it on Turkey’s economy in order to show the economic rationality aspect of 
Turkey’s arms development. 
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5.1. Effect of Arms Industry on Economy 
As discussed in the literature, academic studies suggest that there can be two 
outcomes generated by defense spending. These are positive and negative impacts 
of military expenditures on a country’s economy. What is the implications of national 
military build-up on the economy of Turkey? Turkey is the 18th largest economy in 
the world. Even though until 2010 its military expenditure per GDP was above the 
NATO standards which is 2%, it had been procuring its main military inventories. 
Starting with 2000’s with the initiatives taken by the state, UDI started financing and 
coordinating the projects for the development of defense of arms for the use of 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). That makes private entrepreneurs and businesses the 
recipient of the projects which are given by the state institution to them. Hence, they 
are not the actors who can promote military projects for their own economic 
benefits. Studies of Dritsakis (2004), and Kalyoncu & Yücel (2006) shows that 
economic growth induces defense spending, whereas studies of Sezgin (2001), 
Karagol & Palaz (2004), and Chia-l Pan et al. (2015) indicates defense spending 
increases economic growth in case of Turkey. So either way, for Turkey defense 
spending and economic growth are proven to be complementary to one another.  
 
Previous chapters showed that what makes economies of developing countries 
vulnerable is their import oriented defense expenditures than other public 
expenditures such as education, transportation, and health services. (Canbay, nd, 
p.4; Chan, 1985:34) This creates a balance of payments problem as the price of 
defense goods per kilogram is much too higher compared to the price of other 
manufactured goods, and agricultural products. Foreign dependency of such kind 
damages a country’s economy by creating a trade deficit as well as leaving its national 
security at risk since it is dependent on arms production. (Davutoğlu, 2010, p.39) This 
can only be circumvented through exporting more of high added value goods like in 
the case of the state of the art technology products of the military which can be 
attained through ensuring self-reliance in the defense industry. 
 
As the domestic production of arms of defense decreases the balance of payments 
by reducing imports, the market of arms of defense is also a way for increasing 
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exports which contributes to balance the payments. Demand for arms of defense in 
the international market is very high and it is a very lucrative business because of the 
state of the art technology involved in it. That means what makes arms industry 
products economically valuable is their high added value. So exporting the 
domestically produced arms of defense makes a positive impact on the balance of 
payments too. (Canbay, n.d, p.5) The price of defense industry exports is $26-30 per 
kilogram as R&D and high-tech are being intensely used in the sectoral products. 
(“Savunma ihracat taarruzunda”, 2015) Because the state of the art technology is 
used and a lot of time, research and development, and human capacity are invested 
in the making of the defense industry items, its products are hard to create and hence 
expensive. This gives an advantage to the countries which export them. Because even 
in the high-tech electronics that use R&D and latest innovations highest unit price of 
export is $7.39 for Turkey. (Özdemir, 2015) In 2015, while kilogram price of exports 
for Germany was $3.68, it was $3.86 for Japan, $2.7 for South Korea which are 
countries that intensely use high-technology and only $1.4 for Turkey. (Tim, 2017) A 
way to increase the average value of Turkish products on the international market is 
by having a share in a sector technologically superior and economically valuable like 
military defense industry. 
 
5.2. Military Expenditures in the World and in the Region 
Defense expenditures in the world had shown a decreasing trend towards and after 
the end of the Cold War and with the absence of perception of threat stemming from 
the existence of Soviet Union which brought an end to the arms race between 
communist and capitalist camps. Although the decrease in military expenditures 
continued about a decade, it has been rising incrementally ever since the increase in 
the expenditures of the USA was triggered in 2000’s with the perception of a new 
threat which culminated in the invasion of Iraq. (SSM Performance Programme, 2016, 
p.17) (see  Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1. World Military Spending (billion USD)18 
 
From 2003 through 2015 world military spending has risen about 35% from $1.3 
trillion to 1.7 trillion. Although there is an increase overall in real terms, regionally 
there are differences. Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East show 
increasing trends. The fear emanating from the Russian invasion of Ukraine boosted 
the military spending of neighboring countries in Europe. (Fleurant & Perlo-Freeman, 
2016, p.3) In Asia conflicts with China made an impact on military spending of 
countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam. (Fleurant & Perlo-
Freeman, 2016, p.3) Japan’s military expenditures increased as well emanating from 
threat perceived both from China and North Korea. The Middle East is not different 
in following the trend. But it should be noted that there are countries figures for 
which are unavailable. However, there are internal and regional conflicts pushing 
military measures to take the front seat for the Middle East as well. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
18 Source: Statista 2017: https://www.statista.com/statistics/264434/trend-of-global-military-
spending/  
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Figure 5.2. Military Spending Across Regions19 
 
Iraq’s spending from 2014 to 2015 increased by 35% and reached to $13.1 billion. 
Saudi Arabia’s spending was $87.2 billion in 2015, military burden (%13.7) of which 
is higher than any other country on the global scale. However, the extreme rise in its 
military burden is not caused by GDP decline. On the contrary, while Saudi Arabia’s 
GDP increased by 201% between 2003 and 2015 from $214.5 billion to $646 billion 
(World Bank), its military expenditure increased by 208%. Similarly for Turkey from 
2003 to 2015 there is a rise in GDP. However, as there is no dramatic change in the 
military spending of Turkey what we see is a decline in its share of military burden.  
From 2014 to 2015 active armed conflicts in the world increased from 41 to 50 
because of ISIS’ increasing influence. (SIPRI Year Book, 2016) Unquestionably this 
affects the regional arms race. On the other hand, according to Global Peace Index 
(GPI) peacefulness declined in 2016 which is measured by ¨the number of refugees 
and displaced people; the impact of terrorism; and the number of internal and 
external conflicts, and the associated number of battle-related deaths.¨ (SIPRI Year 
Book, 2016) Because of the civil unrest and terrorism, MENA became the world’s 
least peaceful region, Syria the least peaceful country followed by Iraq in 2015. (2015 
Global Peace Index) This affects the investment made by nation states worldwide in 
armaments especially in regions where there are active conflicts. The result is the 
overall increase in the world military spending. 
                                                                                                                                                      
19 Source: SIPRI data 2016 
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Table 5.1. Share of Military Expenditure in GDP (%) Source: SIPRI 2016 
Share of the Military Expenditure in GDP (%) 
Country 2015 2003 
USA 3.3 3.6 
Saudi Arabia 13.7 8.7 
China 1.9 2.1 
Russia 5.4 3.9 
UK 2 2.3 
World Total 2.39 2.26 
MENA 7.7 5.4 
Turkey 2.1 3.3 
 
Many countries in the Middle East react to threats in the geography by increasing 
their military power in real terms which is revealed in the change of the military 
burden of the region. What Turkey does instead is keeping the level of military 
expenditures the same while strengthening its national production capacity. By doing 
so it manages to meet the country’s security needs domestically on the one hand. On 
the other hand, it does not cut back on other social spendings that are necessary to 
improve the welfare of the society.  
 
5.2.1. Economy of the Military Industry in the World  
Low peace indicators and high levels of conflict may allude to increased arms 
purchases of the states involved or one way or another affected by the conflict. This 
is one side of the coin but there is also another side to it which includes money being 
paid to the industries which produce the transferred arms and contribute to the 
country’s economy. Hence, world’s biggest military spenders do not produce arms 
simply for their own consumption but they have a huge share in international arms 
transfer through which they generate a considerable amount of revenue. ¨ From 1998 
to 2001, the USA, the UK, and France earned more income from arms sales to 
developing countries than they gave in aid.¨ (Control Arms Campaign, 2003, cited by 
Anup Shah in ¨Arms Trade is Big Business¨, 2013) There is no difference in that 
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comparison in 2010’s for the USA. The USA is surely leading the way in terms of aid it 
gives to the developing countries since 1970 but it is also the lead in arms agreements 
made with the same group of countries. The USA made $36.1 billion worth arms 
agreement with developing countries in 2014, while it has given aid worth of $27.5 
billion. (Theohary, 2016; OECD, 2016) In the same year, France made $5.7 billion 
agreement with developing nations whereas it donated $6.5 billion. (Theohary, 2016; 
OECD, 2016) The UK on the other hand in 2012 gave in aid worth of $8.6 billion and 
conducted $5.7 billion worth arms agreements. The record of the US might be the 
very reason why in 1976 Jimmy Carter said in the presidential campaign: “We cannot 
have it both ways. We can’t be both the world’s leading champion of peace and the 
world’s leading supplier of arms.” (Hillier & Wood, 2003, p.60) 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Top 10 Countries’ Share of International Arms Exports (2011-2015) (%)20 
 
Selling and even developing arms of defense generate huge sums of money. 
Respected and prominent countries of the sector do not even have to bear all the 
economic costs of the production since there are standing customers waiting to be a 
part of the production process. The development of the new generation Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) F-35 Lightning II by the US can be an example. The USA is the owner of 
the project and started it with the UK. Later on, 7 other countries joined in. The 
economies and technologies of all included parties are going to benefit from the 
process apart from that of the USA. Turkey is among other 8 states in the consortium 
and the total expected economic benefits for Turkish industry is $12 billion in 
prospect. (“Turkey F-35,” 2015) Italian companies benefited $29 million from engine 
                                                                                                                                                      
20 Source: SIPRI Trends in International Arms Trasfer, 2016, p.2 
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manufacturing for the program and it is expected to reach $15 billion whereas $11 
billion is expected in Canadian industrial opportunities. (“Global Participation,” 2015) 
These all show the contributions to the economies of the participant countries, and 
its impact on the economy of the US is indisputably greater as it will have at its 
disposal the software and codes of the planes which are the most critical parts. With 
including partners to such a project the US reduces its own development costs, finds 
international financing, decreases its own responsibilities and also finds a ready 
market to sell the fighters when the tests are done. 
 
Above was just a recent example of economic benefits provided by being an arms 
producer. It is only one of the projects of such kind with great returns 
notwithstanding a great deal of investments being made and risks having taken.  The 
USA is the world’s biggest military spender with $596 billion and with 3.3% share of 
its GDP. It is the first country with the 33% share in the international arms exports 
and it has been so for the last eight years. (“America’s Arms Exports Dominate 
Despite Global Competition,” 2016) Furthermore, in 2015 alone it exported $16,9 
billion worth arms consisting of 10% of its total exports. Russia comes second in the 
list of international arms transfer again for eight consecutive years with 25% share in 
the international arms exports, and 6.8% of its exports are weapons.  (“Trade Map - 
List of exporters for the selected product (Arms and ammunition; parts and 
accessories thereof & all products),” n.d.) It delivered $7,2 billion worth of arms in 
2015. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Global Arms Deliveries in 2015 (billion USD)21 
                                                                                                                                                      
21 USNews; https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-12-27/americas-arms-exports-dominate-
despite-global-competition 
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The military industry of a country contributes substantially to its economy and 
employment. An AT Kearney conference presentation made on April 2015 
emphasizes the connection between national economic objectives and national 
defense objectives.22 When capabilities are improved for national defense it becomes 
an input for industry prioritization which directly affects national economic 
objectives. (Willen, p.24, 2015) In return when industries expand in a country, it is 
possible to find national solutions than outsourcing. These all improve the career 
opportunities in a country, boosting its economy.  
 
Military industry is a huge sector and the largest economies of world have a 
considerable share in global arms transfer. A critical market for the arms exporters is 
the developing nations which are defined by the report (2016) prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service as ¨all countries except the United States, Russia, 
European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.¨ Since many of the 
countries which are regarded as developing nations cannot meet their armed forces’ 
weapon needs nationally, they have to import it from the nations who does. In 2015 
the USA has 41% of all arms agreements made with the developing nations while 
Russia has 17% and China have 9% share. The share of the major Western European 
countries occupy 27% of arms transfer agreements whereas the rest of the world has 
only 6% of it. (Theohary, 2016) In 2015, 81.7% of all arms transfer agreements were 
concluded with developing nations. It was 80.92% between 2012 and 2015 and 80.39 
between 2008 and 2011.23 (Theohary, p.1, 2016) 
 
From an economical perspective, selling major weapons is not the only source of 
revenue for the arms suppliers. After procuring arms, client states also need spare 
parts, upgrades and support services for further functioning of the equipment. This 
dependency - or the requirements of the existing weapon systems, ensures 
continuity of annual contracts and incomes for the supplier states. (Theohary, p.7, 
                                                                                                                                                      
22 Willen, B. (2015, April). Defense Industry Performance, Trends and Future Expectations. ATKearney 
Conference Presentation, SASAD. 
23 These agreements only contain state to state transactions not the agreements made with the 
subnationals groups.  
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2016) To illustrate the significance of this relationship, one can think of the military 
aid of and arms purchases from the USA and the Soviet Union during the years of the 
Cold War. After the Cold War former clients of these states had to pay for the 
maintenance and spare parts to these states. Turkey for example had American made 
M-60 tanks in its inventories and made payments to the US for any kind of technical 
support in continuing years. Later on, for the modernization of the tanks by Israel, it 
had to pay $687,5 million. (“M60 tanklarının modernize projesi tamamlandı,” 2010) 
By doing so not only the USA and Russia but all the other arms suppliers protect their 
market share. 
 
Although Russia has its own client base, the US and other suppliers are ahead of 
Russia in military R&D programs which makes them more advantageous in the 
international defense industry thanks to having more complicated and advanced 
systems of weaponry. (Theohary, p.8, 2016) According to AT Kearney what makes 
defense industry a future promising market is the developments in technological 
capabilities within the sector. (Willen, 2015) Hence, R&D plays a significant part in 
the future of defense sector affecting the value of the industrial products and as well 
as the economic revenues it will generate. 
 
5.3. Military Spending of Turkey 
Turkey is not a country that jumped early on the industrial train. It was for long an 
agricultural country. Although there were initiatives in industrial projects, it was 
never in the same league with the industrialized nations of the world. In spite of the 
fact that in time industrial production proceeded apace and Turkey got to be 
recognized as a leading and growing power in ready-made clothing, textile, 
automotive industries, it did not reach the same level in technology intensive fields 
such as electronics and defense industry materiels which have a high-profit return to 
the economy. Although Turkey’s military expenditures have not been increasing 
every single year and it had its ups and downs it is known to be the second largest 
military of NATO. And the difference in trend in the beginning of 2000’s and today 
stems not from the volume of the spending but from the way that is chosen for 
military spending which is to use national sources. 
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The increase in the number of unstable regimes neighboring Turkey and realizing it 
cannot depend on the help of its allies along with the opportunities provided by 
economic capabilities and political willingness, Turkey started taking steps in the 
direction of industrial self-reliance. In the beginning, it did not want to depend on any 
one nation for its security, therefore, Turkish companies initiated co-production with 
experienced foreign companies that would provide technology transfer. (Zanotti, 
2011, p.28) Turkey conducted joint military exercises with non-NATO countries in 
order to decrease dependence on one camp. (Zanotti & Clayton, 2017, p.13) It made 
deals with non-US suppliers which would render Turkey flexibility in agreements, and 
hence advance its self-reliance in the defense industry. 
 
What happened when Turkey started producing its own arms of defense was beyond 
meeting the domestic demands. For instance, formerly it was depending on Germany 
and Israel for modernization of its tanks, later The Turkish Aerospace Industries got 
to the level of upgrading F-16s for Jordan. (Enginsoy, 2011) Moreover, like any other 
exporter of arms of defense, Turkey started exporting the materiels it produces. In 
2010 Jane’s World Defence Industry wrote that Turkish defense industry exports 
consisted of eight different platforms:  
 
Among these are missiles, rocket launchers, radios, tracked and wheeled 
vehicles, electronic systems, pilot simulators and coastguard craft. The 
electronic systems and pilot simulators alone represent “big ticket” items that 
can generate the necessary income for Turkey’s indigenous industries to 
develop not only the production base but also the Research and Development 
(R&D) institutions necessary for large-scale expansion. (In Zanotti, 2011, p.45) 
 
Back in 2010, UDI has pointed out the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Arab 
Emirates, South Korea, Algeria and Bahrain as customers of Turkey’s defense 
materiel. (Zanotti, 2011, p.45; “Turkey - Defence Industry,” Jane’s World Defence 
Industry, 2010) In 2016 however, Turkey’s customer base has extended. Even Aselsan 
alone is registered as exporting to 63 countries its products including defense 
industry materiel. Turkey’s exported defense products in 2016 were composed of 
¨aircrafts, helicopter parts, engine, armored land vehicles, speedboats, missiles, 
rockets, launching platforms, command and control systems, light weapon, 
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electronic systems such as transmitter, simulator, sensor and military software.¨ 
(Aliş, 2016) The demand for Turkey’s defense industry materiel is the result of its 
investments to create a national industry, and year by year product range is 
increasing. While analyzing Turkey’s military spending increasing indigenousness that 
plays a big part in its economic transformation should be taken into account. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Turkey’s Military Spending (billion $)24 
 
5.3.1. Economy of the Military Industry in Turkey 
In 2000’s Turkey started playing a role that is very small in the field of defense 
industry. It became an exporter of arms but with a little share compared to the export 
of other sectors. It had been importing most of the arms of defense used by TAF but 
gradually national defense industry meets more and more of the demands of the 
military. While the industry becomes more competent in supplying for domestic 
needs, meanwhile Turkey takes part in the international market of arms of defense. 
For the first time in January 2012, defense industry made its way into Turkey’s export 
sector list only with the percentage of 0.17%. (TIM Report 2012, p.114) Before that 
defense industry was not even on the list that comprised Turkey’s export sectors 
since it did not have any share or its share was negligible. According to 2016 data 
defense industry accounts for 1.2% of all exports. But on the annual basis from 2014 
to 2015, there is a 13% increase in the defense industry exports which corresponds 
to 300 million dollars. (See Table 5.2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
24  Source: SIPRI 2016 
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Table 5.2. Export Figures on Sectoral Basis-1000$ (Source: TimReport 2017) 
 November 2015-2016 2014-2016 
Sectors 2015 2016 chang
e (%) 
share 
(%) 
2014- 
2015 
2015- 
2016 
change 
(%) 
share  
(%) 
industria
l 
products 
6,854,80
8 
7,386,06
7 
7,8 61,8 82,973,27
2 
81,825,54
4 
-1,4 58,1 
defense 108,306 137,917 27,3 1,2 1,546,784 1,749,647 13,1 1,2 
 
In general performance of Turkey’s national defense industry has improved with the 
investments in the sector. For the first time in 2011, it made it to the list of top 15 in 
defense industry expenditures. (TOBB Defense Industry Sector Report, 2012, p.25) 
While Turkey’s export of defense industry products was $331 million in 2003 it 
increased to $1,654 million in 2015 which means there is 400% growth in defense 
exports in 10 years. (Sasad Performance Report, 2015) On the other hand, imports in 
defense industry decreased from $1,351 million to $1,067 million between 2014 and 
2015 which shows 21% decline. (Sasad, PR 2015) These are significant amounts of 
reduction and growth in the sense that it indicates Turkey is much less reliant on 
outside in its defense.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Turkey’s Exports in Defense (million USD)25 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
25 Source: SASAD and SSM all reports including those of 2016 
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From 2015 to 2016 defense industry became the 3rd sector which saw the highest 
increase in exports with 27%. In 2016 alone exports of defense and aerospace 
increased by 1.4% reaching $1.677 billion.  
 
Table 5.3. The Sectors with Most Enhanced Volume of Exports in November 
(Source: TimReport, January 2017, p.126) 
thousand $ 2015 2016 change % 
ship & yacht 101.998 272.209 166,9 
mining products 291.654 383.249 31,4 
defense and aerospace 
industry 
108.306 137.917 27,3 
jewelry 204.973 255.765 24,8 
 
Global trade works in favor of countries that transform their production structure in 
a way to export goods with high added value. The share of high-tech export within 
manufacturing industry for Turkey is 2.2%, lower than any other country in the same 
league. According to World Bank, the ratio for Brazil is 12.3%, 25.8% for China, 26.8% 
for South Korea, 14.7% for Mexico. Eşiyok states that the problem stems from taking 
the easy way out and producing what is cheap since the 80’s rather than what is 
valuable. (Eşiyok, 2017) Hence, what can contribute greatly to Turkey’s economy is 
the export of products with state of the art technology. It is a solution to the balance 
of payments problem Turkey have always been struggling with. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Price per Kilogram in Export (2015) ($)26 
                                                                                                                                                      
26 Source: Tim 2017 
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The increase in Turkey’s exports of arms of defense is critical for the economy as the 
value of sectoral products per kilogram is higher than any other sector. The state of 
the art technology augments the price of the defense industry products which can 
reach up to $30 on average. Additionally, when it comes to projects as big as tanks 
and corvette ship, the kilogram price of export changes between $5.000-10.000.27 
(Özdemir, 2015) This makes these projects more critical for Turkey’s economy as the 
average value of Turkish products will increase. When compared to other countries 
kilogram price of exports of Turkey is very low. 
 
Figure 5.8. Percentage of Sectors in Exports and Prices per Kilogram in 201628 
 
In the long run, when Turkey produces its own arms it is more profitable than 
procuring as they are so expensive. Whereas the excess amount of money that were 
being paid to foreign countries’ firms is also kept inside by doing so, the national 
industry also reaches to a level to compete with foreign producers of arms. It is 
important to produce and be present in the market that will deliver economic 
benefits to a country and since the sectoral products are expensive it is also critical 
to offer a competitive price. According to Defense Outlook 2017 which was a survey 
conducted with defense and aerospace companies’ executives, ensuring the 
affordability of their products is among the top-five concerns of companies. (Dowdy 
& Oakes, 2015) In order to highlight the difference between buying and making I will 
look at the exported versus nationally produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
27 The Chairman of the Board of Directors of SSI (Defence and Aerospace Industry Exporters' 
Association) Latif Aral Aliş cited in Hürriyet 
28 Source: İTO 2016 
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The UAVs known as Heron which became a point of conflict between Turkey and 
Israel had been procured from Israel and used by TAF. 10 Herons costed Turkey $250 
million. (Şimşek, 2016) Similarly, abroad off-the-shelf procurement of 1 system and 3 
air vehicles from Aeronautics29 worth $15.5000 million. (SSM 2013, p.103) Bayraktar 
TB2 is a domestically developed UAV with its critical subsystems including software 
and hardware, and 12 of them cost $47 million with its design and prototype. (Şimşek, 
2016) That means with the money paid to get 1 Heron Turkey can actually produce 
more than 6 UAVs. Bayraktar’s is the first UAV that entered into the inventory of TAF. 
Since its manufacture, armed and non-armed UAVs are being used by TAF to detect 
and remove threats.30 93% of Bayraktar UAV is national and 7% is composed of non-
critical commercial goods which has no problem of procurement. (“Milli İHA’ya giden 
yol”, 2016) Therefore, Bayraktar UAV is also the first exported UAV. (“BAYKAR – 
İnsansız Hava Aracı Sistemleri,” n.d.) By producing this new system of weapons 
Turkey is keeping its financial resources inside and by selling them abroad with a 
competitive price in the international market it can have an edge over other 
producers.  
 
5.3.2. Problems Associated With Non-national Defense Industry 
The level of indigenousness of a product has an important contribution to a country’s 
economy.  However, when it does not belong solely to one country, problems occur. 
Because when an export license of a product does not belong to one country, it 
encounters problems in distributing it. For instance, even though Turkey is producing 
SOM missiles it cannot sell it to Azerbaijan; since its power pack is being procured 
from France, France forbids Turkey from selling it to the third countries. (“Altay tankı 
2018’de TSK’da...,” 2015) Related to this problem former Minister of Defense Yılmaz 
said: ¨95% of the system belongs to you but 5%. Because of that 5%, you cannot sell 
95%. Hence, achieving the production of 100% is our goal.¨ The same problem applies 
to Turkey’s other defense of arms. For instance, as a national powerpack is not 
developed yet for Altay Tank it cannot be sold to third countries. In 2008, EU Common 
                                                                                                                                                      
29 An Israeli company of defense working on systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
30 On September 8, 2016 in Cukurca 29 terrorists detected by Bayraktar armed UAV were eliminated.  
(Sputnik, 2016) 
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Position on military equipment and technology is binding for all member countries 
which provide Turkey among other clients, the critical parts that are being used in 
the national defense industry products. Article 5 of Act adopted under the EU Treaty 
states that: 
 
Export licenses shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of 
end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a 
thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or 
some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. 
When assessing applications for licenses to export military technology or 
equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States 
shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in 
the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be 
diverted or exported to an undesirable end user. (“Acts adopted under the EU 
Treaty,” 2008) 
 
This article is critical in terms of understanding the importance of indigenous 
production. The possible areas of usage by the country of destination is a matter of 
concern for the EU countries. Also, the danger of the end product being used by a 
country which is deemed to be undesirable is a valid reason for an export license to 
be refused. Moreover, the word undesirable is open to interpretation and any end 
user can be defined as undesirable when the interests of one or more member 
countries are at stake. 
 
According to the Article 1 criteria 4 of the same Act: ¨Member States shall deny an 
export license if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military 
technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to 
assert by force a territorial claim.¨ If Turkey is threatened by another country can 
Turkey’s military response be taken as an aggressive act? Again the 7th criterion of 
the same article states that: ¨Existence of a risk that the military technology or 
equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under 
undesirable conditions is a reason for denying an export license in which case 
undesirable conditions is very open to interpretation.¨ 
 
When all of these are taken into consideration, the importance of total ownership of 
a defense of arms is obvious. Only after that, a country can export and enjoy full 
 86 
economic benefits of its own production. Even though the case of Bayraktar UAV is 
promising, the situation is not always favorable. Turkey is importing power packs in 
all main sectors. According to 2013 Sasad Performance Report large segment of 
imports consist of those critical components (Sasad PR, 2013, p.24) which means that 
Turkey is still dependent when it comes to critical parts like power packs, and it makes 
Turkey vulnerable to the fluctuations in relations with supplier countries. For 
example, a local company Tümosan that had undertaken the project to develop a 
powerpack for the nationally produced Altay tank encountered problems with its 
technical support provider which was an Austrian firm, AVL. In the beginning, AVL 
was chosen among many other suppliers as it was the only one that guaranteed to 
provide an export license for the power pack to be developed which would not create 
any problems in domestic and abroad uses and selling of the power pack. Within 
three months, AVL declared that it cannot deliver the promised document although 
all the diplomatic channels with Austria were used. In its declaration to Public 
Informing Platform (KAP), Tümosan stated that (2017, p.1): 
 
The technologies related to the power pack of the main battle tank are 
perceived to be an important component of national power, and for this reason 
in order to prevent Turkey from obtaining such technology especially the 
countries that have it and control the market are observed to have negative 
attitudes. 
 
As a result of this, some of the foreign subsystem producers that manufacture critical 
parts do not get to make contracts with Turkey that would deliver the critical 
technologies. Even if they do so, the agreements can be revoked because of the 
attitudes of the foreign governments that either completely prevents a contract or 
prevents a one that is required by Turkey in order to be able to have full control over 
the product when it comes to use it or sell it. In this case, technology transfer would 
be prevented because of the sanctions imposed. With the problems of technology 
transfer, Tumosan cancelled the contract to develop a powerpack for Altay Main 
Battle Tank. (“Turkey’s Altay MBT project hit by engine technology transfer issues | 
IHS Jane’s 360,” 2017) The main problem encountered with the Austrian firm was not 
a commercial disagreement but a political one caused by Austrian Parliament’s 
decision taken on November 2016 to ban the export of military equipments and 
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materiel to Turkey. Austrian Parliament based its decision of arms embargo on 
operations against opposition, suspension of civil servants, and death of civilians in 
military operations. (“Türkiye Avusturya’dan hangi silahları alıyor?,” 2016) All of the 
reasons presented interfere with Turkey’s domestic affairs and the death of civilians 
in military operations specifically refers to killing of the PKK members. Hence, 
Austria’s political stance and approach to Turkey’s terror problem influences its 
company’s decision to sell arms to Turkey. 
 
Apart from Austria’s decision, German Ministry of Economy rejected arms export 
applications 11 times within the last four months. (“Türkiye’ye tank savunma sistemi 
satmak isteyen Alman şirkete izin verilmedi,” March 2017) According to Germany’s 
decision Rheinmetall cannot sell defense system for tanks which were damaged 
during the fight with the Islamic State that costed Turkey 10 Leopard Tanks. 
Rheinmetall CEO reportedly said: German Government still does not approve some 
of our export contracts. (“Almanya’dan Türkiye’ye bir yasak daha,” 2017) German 
officials defend their position regarding the embargo with reference to concern for 
human rights. A ministry official stated that ever since the coup attempt, there has 
been a concern on the side of Germany that Turkey can use arms it bought from 
Germany “for internal repression of the Kurdish conflict¨. (“Germany denied several 
arms shipments to Turkey in past months – reports,” 2017) Germany’s and Austria’s 
decision depend on the same reasons which show that political reasoning can be 
used by foreign governments to refuse export of military supplies. Furthermore, both 
countries are Turkey’s partners in NATO one of the major principles of which is 
collective defense stating that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack 
against all allies. By stipulating this in Article 5, NATO guarantees protection to the 
member states in case of an attack. However, from the perspective of Turkey, the 
recent embargoes are reasons to be hesitant about the help of its allies.  
 
Briefly, when a country is dependent on outside in terms of its defense it renounces 
its power and capacity to act independently according to its national interests. Such 
a dependence also limits the ability of that country to fully benefit from what is at its 
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disposal. Hence, it is of utmost importance for any country including Turkey to 
develop a self-reliant defense industry to practice its free will.  
 
5.4. The Importance of Political Economy of the Defense Industry 
Development of a national defense industry is not an end itself, it reduces a country’s 
trade deficit by decreasing imports and increasing exports; it increases R&D which 
ensure product development and technological advancements; its innovations 
spread into other fields and lead new inventions which will increase capacity 
utilization; and as it increases investments it will also create new business 
opportunities all of which are going to come back as economic profits to Turkey.  
 
In this chapter, I discussed the political economy of defense industry. I firstly analyzed 
the literature about the effect of arms industry on economy. Secondly, I looked 
closely at the economy of military industry in the world, in the region and in Turkey 
respectively. And I concluded by discussing the problems associated with non-
national defense industry.  
 
The domestic structure that explains the political will of politicians, economy of 
defense industry which provides the economic rationale and the regional geopolitics 
which explained the conjunctural changes and lack of trust in allies are necessary 
conditions for developing a self-reliant defense industry. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
The benefits of having a national defense industry are countless which are outlined 
in the entire thesis. Countries, in general, aspire to be independent in defense out of 
same concerns. States like Turkey, South Africa, Taiwan, Brazil, India, and China had 
all experienced the consequences of over-dependence to foreign countries in 
national defense especially in times when they needed the exported military supplies 
to overcome internal or external threats. In such cases dependent countries become 
vulnerable and open to the dangers of political manipulation. Moreover, they 
become incapable of steering the results of the events as they do not possess the 
necessary resources. Turkey is one such country that has learned the indispensability 
of industrial self-reliance hard way. 
 
The literature showed that domestic structure model and action-reaction model 
explain the urge to nationalize the defense industry. However, lack of security 
commitments of allies was not a part of the either model but contributes a lot to our 
understanding of nationalization efforts. Hence, I added it to the action-reaction 
model to comprehend the process better. Then, I applied these models to the Turkish 
case. Together these models demonstrated the internal and external dynamics that 
promote the process which I expatiated on three separate chapters. Domestic 
structure of the country is important since a stable government can create an 
environment that is conducive to undertake long-term military projects. Turkey’s 
current government that has been elected consecutively since 2002 is important in 
that respect. Because defense industry projects that are initiated by the ruling party 
were not disrupted by another political party which enabled the projects to continue 
without a hitch.  
 
The world military order that drives countries to maintain their security in the face of 
increasing threats perpetuates the worldwide arms race and creates a vicious cycle 
impossible to break is. It is another variable affecting Turkey’s military build-up. I 
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argued that the rising militarization of its neighbors is alarming more for Turkey than 
for Turkey’s allies in the West. Because recent conjunctural changes affect Turkey’s 
security along with its diplomatic and economic relations with the countries in its 
geography.  
 
Furthermore, as the international security move from conventional to modern and 
technological defense materiel, problems concerning the security of a country needs 
to be taken care of more quickly and delicately. The problem is not always the 
interruption in the delivery of modern technology by the arms supplier. But when the 
foreign technology is used it can be blocked by whoever has designed the software. 
Moreover, in the age of information technology where everything became accessible 
keeping the sensitive critical information concerning the national security a secret is 
even harder. When the technology is designed by another country it is even 
impossible. For these reasons, it is of vital importance for Turkey to develop its own 
critical military technology to deal with internal and external security threats.   
Because as I have shown interest-dilemma Turkey experiences with arms providers 
even when they are considered to be allies can be terminated. And more arms 
embargoes are yet to come as long as Turkey seeks its own interests. 
 
In that regard, supporting research and development activities is highly important for 
Turkey’s purposes. Technology is becoming an inevitable and the most critical 
component of the defense industry. Hence, the collaboration between universities 
and industries; allocating more resources for technology development both by state 
and private institutions are key to success in a world where even the most recent 
technologies are updated, renewed, and replaced by a newer one. 
 
Moreover, owning national arms of defense provides strategic advantages to 
countries in terms of international relations and politics. I have shown through 
reviewing parties’ election declarations that Turkey with its agenda of becoming a 
regional and world power want the prestige that is brought by having a strong 
military. Besides, having the state-of-the-art technology at its disposal will give 
Turkey the freedom to choose whom to sell and where to send its military 
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technology. Seeing its allies acting in such a way which can run counter to and harm 
Turkey’s interests from time to time encourages and forces Turkey to develop a 
domestic defense industry. By doing so, Turkey too can determine the outcome of 
the conflicts in favor of its own foreign policy which is a great leverage for Turkey.  
 
The political economy of defense industry which has implications at both domestic 
and international levels shows the economic costs and benefits generated by the 
defense industry which is compelling for Turkey. In the last chapter, I outlined how 
big of an economy it generates worldwide and also on the country basis. As a country 
which spends a lot on defense purchases, Turkey sees industrial self-reliance in such 
a sector with high-added value as a way of decreasing imports and increasing exports. 
This in return is expected to maintain the balance of payment which is a critical 
problem for Turkey. Besides, I have shown the costs of production and procurement 
which makes the domestic production a logical and profitable option for Turkey. 
 
On the other hand, even though economies of developing countries suffer from 
expensive military projects as they divert resources from other sectors, this is not a 
problem experienced by Turkey. Developing nations have to cut back on country’s 
social spending to canalize large amounts of money into producing arms. So they 
experience an opportunity cost between making arms and enhancing the welfare of 
the society. By contrast, Turkey does not steal from the budgets of socially 
constructive sectors. Because its GDP increases and the share of military 
expenditures within it decreases from 2.6% in 2009 to 1.5% in 2016. (NATO, 2016) 
This, as a result, shows that Turkey keeps the military spending stable while setting 
aside more capital for social projects. By closely examining the years since 2003 to 
2017, I have concluded that this downside of diversion of resources is not valid for 
Turkey. 
 
Furthermore, I have concluded that what makes military spending of 2015 different 
than that of 2003 is not the volume of expenditures. It is the increasing capacity of 
the local defense industry to meet the requirements of TAF. In 2002, the local arms 
production was able to meet 20% of the domestic demand, while it reached to 60% 
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in 2015. It not only frees Turkey from international regulations that limit the use of 
procured arms. Since the affordability of products is among the five top concerns in 
the defense sector it also gives Turkey a comparative advantage in the international 
market as it produces with lower costs.  
 
Although I started this thesis with the advantages of the national defense industry in 
mind, my research has shown that there are problems that come along with the 
nationalization process. Emerging producers encounter obstacles with the existing 
powers who may refuse to grant production and export licenses and intelligence-
gathering systems due to security and diplomatic concerns. When countries try to 
start from scratch to produce the same technology, they have to sacrifice a lot of 
time, human capital, and money. While emerging producers are busy with catching 
up with the existing technology, owners of it go one step further which invalidate the 
previous one new comers has just obtained. This is also a matter of concern for 
Turkey, but if it does not start production at a certain stage, the technological gap 
between Turkey and other leading producers is doomed to increase.  
 
As a country that is in the process of nationalizing its defense industry, Turkey is 
pursuing ambitious projects stretching from the production of a warplane and main 
battle tank to battle ship and unmanned aerial vehicles. Even though this is more 
suitable for sovereignty and national security, trying to nationally produce every 
single defense of arms is not cost-effective. Dividing up all its human capital and 
budget among different projects prevents it from specializing and excelling in one 
product. This autarky-efficiency dilemma is a challenge Turkey faces. If it can focus its 
energy, time, and capital on one specific item and win recognition over it, then it can 
actually gain a competitive position in the international market. Having a 
distinguished product at its disposal gives Turkey leverages which it can use to 
bargain with other arms suppliers who have a superior technology in another 
product. 
 
This thesis provided an insight about nationalization of more of the modern arms 
industry. The recent arms embargoes Turkey is subjected by Germany and Austria 
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manifests how important it is to study the issue of nationalization of the defense 
industry.  Hence, future research can be conducted on problems such a process is 
likely to give rise to and how to tackle such problems without causing further harm 
to bilateral relations while maintaining the continuance of industrial production. The 
change in Turkey’s security perception is another topic to be studied. Other countries 
that have gone through nationalization process can be compared with the Turkish 
experience. The reason of success and failure for alternative countries can set an 
example for Turkey and help it to learn from the mistakes of others. Furthermore, 
modern defense systems can be studied such as cyber and nuclear technologies, 
satellite and communication systems and intelligence technologies and alternative 
unmanned defense vehicles which seem to be the way national and international 
security evolves into. 
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